The effect of taxes on distribution of income in Turkey by Onaran, Özlem
* -J. «t***-t -fi*“?· '«f» «y
. v^< ,4 jt А]Л\Г i ^  ;·.·'^  *
r W V -^  мш·« ·. ам( W ' M' x ^ '« i' )■'' i
:^ ε·Ϊ5υΒΰΏ©?!! Í5¿· J¿'5'D;:3í  Й Tiy^ ÄiY
é Tb,ú¿-.?''. Ù M OJ'v ^‘j ^
S l t ó t b l i  iä) SiïOKDjjjÎS^ lî
' i i i  kÆ 'ïfSB ¿fl
В^ійбн!
3jj Püíílái í-yiiíiibjíili i /  i]iií
Ѣ :  İL · o !
ЗТізШ-д'чЗ*·;-· ν J W -· w' u' "■'
.7 ? . . . . ^  f': ,
,  1 y..
''¡’2«?Г// .' Й ·''’*
THE EFFECT OF TAXES 
ON
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN TURKEY
A Thesis
Submitted to the Department o f Economics 
and the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences o f
Bilkent University
In Partial Fullfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN ECONOMICS
by
Özlem Onaran 
May, 1994
jO a ie w . ....OKr’.A.'E.A*?.......
HJ
g ' î t O . L ,  
• 0 5 i
й > 0 2 ' і? Л
K
I certify that I've read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully 
adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of 
Master of Science in Economics.
5  Ouk
Prof. Dr. Sydney N. Afriat
I certify that I've read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully 
adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of 
Master of Science in Economics.
v/cJtU
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erinç Yeldan
I certify that I've read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully 
adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of 
Master of Science in Economics.
Assoc. ProfrDr. Osman Zaim
Approved by the Institue of Social and Economic Sciences
ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF TAXES 
ON
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN TURKEY
ÖZLEM ONARAN
M.S. in Economics
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Osman Zaim 
May 1994
This study analyzes the effects of tax system on distribution of income in 
Turkey. For this purpose, the geneal elements in the system, such as 
distribution of direct and indirect taxes; taxes on income, wealth and 
expenditures; effect of inflation are analyzed. The measures of degree of 
progression are applied to income taxation and the distribution of effective tax 
burden over factor income groups is analyzed. An additional discussion is 
made about the distribution of value-added tax biu^den as percentage of 
monthly disposable income. Combining the results, it is found that the tax 
system in Turkey redistributes income to the disadvantage of tow income 
individuals and working masses. A more progressive and unitary income tax 
structure; a low, uniform rated value-added tax scheme with a progressive 
reimbursement mechanism is proposed to increase tax equity even without 
reducing tax revenue.
Key Words: Turkey, distribution of income, income tax, progressivity,
effective tax burden, value-added tax, regressivity.
m
ÖZET
TÜRKİYE'DE VERGİLERİN 
GELİR DAĞILIMINA ETKİSİ
ÖZLEM ONARAN 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi; Doç. Dr. Osman Zaim 
Mayıs 1994
Bu çalışma, Türkiye'de vergi yapısının gelir dağılımı üzerine etkilerini 
incelemektedir. Bu amaçla, dolaylı ve dolaysız vergilerin, gelirden, servetten 
ve harcamalardan alınan vergilerin dağılımı; enflasyonun etkileri gibi vergi 
yapısının genel özellikleri incelenmiştir. Gelir vergisine artan oranlılık 
derecesiyle ilgili ölçümler uygulanmıştır ve efektif vergi yükünün faktör 
gelirlerine göre dağılımı incelenmiştir. Katma değer vergi yükünün, aylık 
harcanabilir gelirin yüzdesi olarak dağılımına dair bir tartışma yapılmıştır. 
Sonuçlar birleştirilerek, Türkiye'nin vergi yapısının geliri düşük gelir grupları 
ve çalışanlann aleyhine yeniden dağıttığı bulunmuştıu·. Vergi gelirlerini 
azaltmaksızın vergi adaletini arttırmak için daha artan oranlı ve üniter bir gelir 
vergisi yapısı; düşük, sabit oranlı bir katma değer vergisi ve artan oranlı bir 
vergi iadesi şeması önenlmiştir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Türkiye, gelir dağılımı, gelir vergisi, artan oranlılık, 
efektif vergi yükü, katma değer vergisi, azalan oranlılık.
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1 Introduction
Public finance is an important part of the economic activity of the 
governments. Taxation has the heaviest weight within the government budget 
that is used to finance the public expenditure programs. When we consider the 
volume of the economic activity of the government, we see that both taxation 
and the general policy applied within the public expenditure program have 
important effects on the redistribution of income. There comes out the trade off 
between efficiency and fairness in a public finance structure. On the one hand, 
there is an efficiency cost, if the taxes distort the optimality conditions for the 
individuals' economic decisions. On the other hand, the system must provide 
some degree of fairness in taxation that is determined by the social welfare 
function of the community. The optimal level of the provision of public goods 
and services, the tax rates on income and expenditures and the types of the 
taxes will be determined through a complex system of social and individual 
preferences in a society with different individuals.
Though it is very important to build the necessary data base for such an 
optimal tax model for Turkey, for the time being we will analyze the existing 
situation in Turkey, especially from the view point of redistribution of income 
through taxation.
First we will comment on the general elements in the Turkish Tax Structure 
that are effective on the distribution of income. Then we will focus on two 
very important items in the taxation system: Taxes on income and value-added 
tax. Here we will analyze the change in the degree of progressivity of income 
taxation and the distribution of effective tax burden over different income 
groups. The calculations about the distribution of the burden of VAT will 
complete this analysis. In both parts the relevant discussions in public finance 
will be reviewed.
As a result of these analyses, we will propose some solutions or keys to 
solutions in order to achieve a tax system that is effective in maintaining a 
more equal distribution of income. In doing so, considering the trade off 
between level of tax revenue and fairness, we will try to find out ways of 
achieving a more progressive tax stmcture without big reductions in the tax 
revenue.
2.1 Introduction
Before we analyze specific parts of the Turkish tax structure, it is more 
convenient to have a global look at the system. For this purpose we'll analyze 
the general structure of the tax system in terms of the share of the direct and 
indirect taxes, taxes on income, wealth and expenditures; exemptions and the 
effect of inflation.
2.2 The Share of Direct and Indirect Taxes in the System
The share of the direct and indirect taxes in the tax system is a major factor 
that determines the fairness of a tax structure. Indirect taxes are regressive 
taxes; the tax incidence is on consumers and therefore the tax burden on 
families with low income, who have to allocate a larger share for consumption 
in their budget, increase. However, in some cases indirect taxes are adopted to 
raise a progressive effect, especially when they are put on luxurious goods.
In Turkey, the indirect tax rates on goods and services are quite high and 
this creates a regressive effect. In addition to this, the degree of progressivity 
of direct taxes is decreasing through years. The extensive application of 
exemptions and the erosion in the income tax brackets due to inflation, distorts 
the ability of direct taxes to achieve tax equity. The analysis about the degree 
of progressivity of income taxation and the distributional aspects of value- 
added taxation will be considered in the following pints.
When we observe the distribution of direct and indirect taxes within the 
total tax revenue, we see that between 1980 and 1993, the share of indirect 
taxes was 37% at the beginning and it increased gradually with a steeper 
increase after 1985 (See Table 2.1 in Part 2.7: Appendix). The reason for this 
sharp increase is basically the adoption of VAT in 1985. Afterwards the shares 
of direct and indirect taxes within total tax revenue have become equal and in 
1993 the expected share of direct taxes is 48% whereas the share of indirect 
taxes is 52%. It will be useful to compare these numbers with those in EEC 
and OECD countries. In 1990 the average share of the indirect taxes in total tax 
revenue is 23.6% and 28.6% in EEC and OECD countries respectively.' The 
share of indirect taxes in Turkey in 1990 is 48% and this is the highest number 
among all other countries.
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2.3 Taxes on Income, Wealth and Expenditures
The distribution of taxes on income, wealth and expenditures is another 
important point of analysis. In fact this distinction is not very different from 
the distinction between direct and indirect taxes. The taxes on income and 
wealth represent direct taxes whereas the taxes on expenditures represent 
indirect taxes. However, it's still important to distinguish between the taxes on 
income and wealth.
Between 1982 and 1993, taxes on income have the highest share within total 
tax revenue (See Table 2.2 for the Percentage Distribution of General Budget 
Collected Tax Revenue). However this share has decreased from 58.6% in 
1982 to 47.2% in 1993. Taxes on income include income taxation and 
corporate taxation. The largest share within total tax revenue belongs to 
income taxation. The share of corporate tax has reached to a level of 15% in 
mid 80’s; however the number decreased to 6.6% in 1993. The OECD and 
EEC averages for the share of income tax are lower than that for Turkey and 
the situation is just the opposite for corporate tax share (See Table 2.3 and 2.4).
The share of taxes on wealth within total tax revenue is very low. Between 
1981 and 1993, apart from small changes, this ratio has been around 0.8-0.9%. 
This share is even lower than half of the average share of taxes on wealth in 
the OECD and EEC countries (See Table 2.5). The share of taxes on wealth 
should be higher also in Turkey for measures of tax equity.
Through the period in concern, the share of taxes on goods and services has 
increased from 24.6% to 34.5%. The taxes on goods and services have the 
second highest share within total tax revenue. The high proportion of taxes on 
expenditures negatively effects the distribution of income for low income 
earning individuals.
2.4 Exemptions
2.4.1 The General and Special Exemption
It's a common practice for most of the countries to exempt a certain level of 
income from tax. For the sake of tax equity, it is accepted that the ability to 
pay tax begins above a certain level of income. According to the "ability to 
pay" principle, the tax rates on wage income should be relatively lower and/or 
there should be a special exemption for a certain part of wage income, since 
the wage earners usually have lower ability to pay than profit earners.
In Turkey the application of general and special exemption started in 1981 
and the level of exemption stayed constant until 1985. Between 1981 and 1985, 
the general exemption was 20 TL of the daily earning for the individual tax 
payer and there were additional exemptions of 15 TL/day for the mate and 5 
TL/day for the children who were dependent on the tax payer. The level of
special exemption, which was available only for the wage income earners, was 
150 TL/day, 4500 TL/day and 54000 TL/year. This level of discount was equal 
to the minimum wage level of the period. In 1986 the general exemption was 
canceled and was added to the special exemption level whose amount increased 
to 72.000 TL. The later arrangements were quite meaningless when compared 
with the high levels of inflation. Table 2.6 shows the real amount of special 
exemption for each year. The real amounts are obtained by deflating the 
nominal amounts by the consumer price index on the basis of 1981. If we 
accept the real exemption index in 1981 as 100, then in 1993 the index has 
decreased to 21.8 (See third column of Table 6). The exemption level in 1994, 
which is 600.000 TL/month is also much lower than the minimum wage level.
The exemption level for income taxation in Turkey, is also lower than other 
countries. In most countries the income necessary for minimum survival level 
is either exempted from tax or there are reimbursement mechanisms for the tax 
paid on this level of income.
In 1984, in countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia who has a GDP amount near 
to Turkey, the ratio of exemption to family income for a foiu--individual family 
who earns a minimum level of income was 78%. The same ratio was 268% and 
123% in Indonesia and Thailand respectively, whereas it is only 10% in 
Turkey.- Moreover, different from many other countries in Turkey 
expenditures like education or health isn't subject to any exemption. Therefore 
the level of exemption is quite irrelevant.
As a result the special exemption that was received by wage earners had a 
low level right from the beginning, and by the rapid rise of inflation through 
years, the exemption has completely lost its effect.
2.4.2 Other Exemptions and Immunities
There are some economic and social reasons for exempting some part of 
expenditures, income or wealth of tax payers. Although this generally has the 
purpose of creating incentive for productive activity, exports, etc., there also 
exists the disadvantages in terms of decreasing the tax revenue of government 
and creating tax advantages for some tax payers while distorting the tax equity 
and income distribution.
The exemptions for artisans, small agriculture's and the ones who earn a 
minimal level of income, have social purposes. On the other hand the 
exemptions in corporate taxation and exemptions for investment usually have 
economic purposes, such as creating incentive for certain activities. Most of the 
exemptions in Turkey are in corporate taxation and/or for investment. In 
general such exemptions have been widely applied after 1980 to motivate 
exchange earning activities and institutionalization.
EWorld Bank (1987), p.39.
Investment exemption has been adopted to support economic development 
and to create incentive for private investment in certain sectors. When the firm 
benefits from investment exemption, a certain percentage of investment 
expenditures can be discounted from taxable profits.
In order to benefit from investment exemption, the firm must determine its 
profits according to balance sheet and the investment in consideration must be 
proper according to the development plans that are prepared by the State 
Institute of Planning. In general the investment must be at least 1 billion TL; 
for agricultural sector and for the sectors that are accepted by the High 
Planning Committee this amount is 100 million TL.
The investment discount is usually 30% of the total investment. This ratio 
increases upto 40% for investments related to regional development and 
agricultural sector. Hundred percent of discount is also possible in regions that 
have priority in development plans.
Though exemption for investment gives incentive for investment, it also 
causes a certain percentage of income not to be taxed. The basic purpose of 
exemption for investment is to increase total investment, employment, 
efficiency and production in the long run. It is usually assumed that this 
increase can tolerate for the reduction in public revenue. But, there is also a 
probability such that exemption for investment will cause a general reduction 
in investment level by causing a reduction in public inve.stment.
In general there are 21 immunity and 18 exemption items in the corporate 
taxation law. The total exemptions and immunities added upto 593 billion TL 
in 1985 and this amount increased 7.5 times in 1988 upto 4.5 trillion TL.
The increase in certain exemptions and immunities is particularly striking. 
Especially the amount of exemptions for exports and investment has increased 
11 times between 1985 and 1988. Table 2.7 shows the development of 
exemptions and immunities in this period.
It is more important to observe the effective tax rates and tax losses in 
corporate taxation. The ratio of total amount of exemption to the pre­
exemption profit in the corporate sector increased from 23.3% in 1985 to 
45.6% in 1987 and 42.2% in 1988. The ratio of tax loss to the realized 
corporate tax revenue is 92% in 1988. Thus, in 1987 and 1988 there has been a 
tax loss that is equal to the realized tax revenue, through legal mechanisms. 
Table 2.8 shows the tax loss and effective tax rates in corporate taxation 
between 1985 and 1988.
The effective corporate tax rates are quite below the legal rate. Especially in 
1987 and 1988 the effective tax rates that are 22 and 21% respectively, don't 
reach even to half of the legal rate which was 46%. By 1994, the legal rate is 
25% and there is a legal restriction of 20% for the lower bound of the 
effective rate. But the confusion about the exemptions is not settled yet.
The number of exemptions and immunities in the law and the total amount 
that they add upto has caused corporate taxation to lose its real identity and to
turn out to be a law of exemptions. Also, the items of exemptions and 
immunities were not chosen after a detailed research about how they would 
effect the economy and the authorities haven't been selective enough in their 
choices. As a result some tax payers have developed a tendency to make use of 
the law of exemption for the purpose of tax evasion.
The exemptions and immunities in the tax system create an important 
distortion in relative prices between sectors that are exempted and that aren't. 
Moreover, in sectors that make use of the tax exemptions the effective tax 
rates are very low and this causes a ftuther distortion in terms of horizontal tax 
equity in addition to the vertical equity.
2.5 The Effect of Inflation on Tax System
The high rates of inflation that Turkey has been experiencing for a long period, 
effect all the elements of the tax system. The effects of inflation must be 
considered both from the view point of government and tax payers. In periods 
of high inflation, if the absolute numbers in the tax system aren't changed, then 
an important level of real erosion takes place in specific tax rates, exemptions, 
immunities and income tax brackets. The erosion in specific rates creates an 
advantage for tax payers. Conversely, all other erosions increase the tax 
revenue, thus creates an advantage for the government.^ In addition to these, 
inflation effects the value of quantities like interest income, stocks and wealth 
that are important items of the tax base. Therefore in general, inflation distorts 
the distribution of after tax income.
The mostly effected tax by inflation is the income tax. As nominal income 
increases due to inflation, the income tax brackets don't rise proportionally 
with inflation. Therefore the ones who are in lower tax brackets creep upto 
higher brackets. This creates a disadvantage for the tax payer and an advantage 
for the government in terms of tax revenue. On the other hand, the exemptions 
in income taxation, which are determined by nominal amounts, cannot compete 
with the high rates of inflation and this further increases the tax burden on tax 
payers. Moreover, since the width of the brackets increases more as we move 
up the income scale and the marginal tax rates are constant after a certain level 
of income, the individuals who are at the higher income levels don't experience 
the disadvantage that is caused by the bracket creep.
Inflation distorts both the progressive structure of the income tax scheme 
and the structure of corporate tax, taxes on wealth, etc. which are expressed by 
constant values due to the erosion in the tax base.
Also, the inflation tax that is bom out of the erosion in the value of liquid 
assets due to inflation, has created an important burden over large masses. It is 
reported that, during 1980's, the average burden of inflation tax over the
^$enatalar, B. (1990), p.34.
society has been around 3% of GNP·*. There are basically two ways to confront 
the problems that are created by inflation: The quantities that are expressed in 
nominal terms in the tax structure (income tax bracket, exemptions, etc.) can 
be indexed with respect to inflation rate or the tax system can be adjusted 
manually each year. During 1980's, there has been a great deal of adjustment in 
tax brackets and exemptions to catch up with the rises in prices. However we 
cannot talk of a success story about this attempt. There are only a few cases 
where the adjustments followed the inflation rate closely^. The history of 
general and special exemptions in income taxation, which we have already 
analyzed and the structure of income taxation that we will analyze in the 
following chapter proves these weaknesses.
Indexation method has been preferred by most of the Western countries 
after the high inflation rates in 1970's. However the problem doesn't end by a 
simple indication. Usually the index used for the adjustments, namely CPI, 
which gives a "summary" of the changing relation between commodities and 
consumers. This summary is by means of a single number and represents the 
average consumer. But when the level of unstability of the prices and the 
inequality in the distribution of income increases, neither CPI nor any other 
single number can adequately explain the real effect of price changes on 
different individuals. When relative prices change as well, the impact of this 
change will be as important as that of average price change. The adjustment of 
income tax brackets will be even harder under high inflationary conditions. 
There is the possibility that, when the price of the basic necessities is rising and 
the price of the superior goods is falling, the cost of living could be rising for 
the poor and falling for the rich^. CPI cannot explain such complexities. The 
simple application of CPI in the adjustment of tax brackets will under 
compensate the poor and overcompensate the rich, since it is only an average 
value for the real relation. The simple application of CPI to tax bracket 
adjustment could turn a progressive tax system into one with a regressive 
effect. An inflation-free tax system should eliminate this possibility. This is not 
a matter of constructing price indices for different groups, but of stepping back 
from the price index concept itself.’ In our analysis we will use the CPI to 
deflate the nominal values, although we are aware of the bias that is carried 
within this single number. This small remark points at the necessity to rework 
the data about the price changes in Turkey.
•»Uluatam, 6  (1990), p.26. 
^ibid. pp.32-33.
'^Afriat, S. N. (1994). 
’ibid.
2.6 Conclusion and Suggestions
The share of the direct and indirect taxes, the distribution of tax revenue 
between taxes on income, corporate profits, wealth and expenditures are all 
important items in building the criteria for tax equity. The position of Turkey, 
in terms of tax equity, is worse than the OECD and EEC countries on the 
average.
The level of exemption in income taxation has become completely 
irrelevant in time, whereas the exemptions in corporate taxation have increased 
to such an amount that they have almost turned out to be a legitimate 
mechanism for tax evasion. This is an important factor that contributes to the 
decreasing level of tax equity in Turkey. The system of exemptions needs a 
great deal of reconsideration.
The level of inflation especially creates disadvantages for the low income 
individuals and this further decreases the degree of progressivity in the tax 
system. There is an urgent need for an automatic adjustment mechanism in the 
tax system that considers the different rates of inflation applying to different 
income groups.
2.7 Appendix
Table 2.1 The Share of Direct and Indirect Taxes and VAT within 
Total Tax Revenue (1970-1993)
Table 2.2 Percentage Distribution of Tax Revenue (1982-1993)
Table 2.3 Share of Income Tax in Total Tax Revenue in OECD and EEC 
Table 2.4 Share of Corporate Tax in Total Tax Revenue in OECD and EEC 
Table 2.5 Share of Tax on Wealth in Total Tax Revenue in OECD and EEC 
Table 2.6 Special Exemption in Income Taxation (1981-1993)
Table 2.7 The Exemptions in Corporate Taxation (1985-1988)
Table 2.8 Tax Loss and Effective Tax Rates in Corporate Taxation 
(1985-1988)
Table 2.1: The Share of Direct, Indirect Taxes & VAT
Years Direct Taxes (%) Indirect Taxes (%) VAT (%)
1970 38 62 -
1971 38 62 -
1972 39 61 -
1973 42 58 -
1974 46 54 -
1975 47 53 -
1976 47 53 -
1977 53 47 -
1978 57 43 -
1979 58 42 -
1980 63 37 -
1981 60 40 -
1982 60 40 -
1983 57 43 -
1984 57 43 -
1985 47 53 28.1
1986 52 48 29.2
1987 50 50 31.3
1988 50 50 . 31.4
1989 53 47 27.1
1990 52 48 28.1
1991 52 48 29.8
1992 50 50 29.9
1993 48 52 31.2
Source: Ministry of Finance (1993).
Table 2.2: Percentage Distribution of General Budget Tax Revenue (1982-1993)
Type of Revenue 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1-Total Tax Revenue (2+5+8+9+10) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
2-Taxes on Income (3+4) 58.8 56.6 56.5 46.3 51.1 48.9 48.6 52.7 51.2" 51.4 49.5 47.2
3-lncome Tax 45.6 45.5 45.1 34.6 35.2 34.2 33.7 38.6 41 42.4 42.4 40.6
4-Corporate Tax 13.2 11.1 11.5 11.7 15.9 14.7 14.9 14.1 10.2 9 7.1 6.6
5-Taxes on Wealth (6+7) 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.7 1 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
6-Tax on Motor Vehicles 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8"
7-Tax on Bequest 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
8-Taxes on Goods & Expenditures 24.5 26.8 25.3 28.7 31 30.6 31.5 29.9 30.1 31.4 33.4 34,5
9-Taxes on External Trade 10.4 12.3 15.6 19.5" 16.6 19.6 18.8 16.6 17.7 16.4 16.1 17.1
10-Remedies of Canceied Taxes 5.6 3.6 1.9 4.9 0.3 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.2~
Source: Ministry of Finance (1993).
Table 2.3: Share of Income Tax in Total Tax Revenue in OECD and EEC
C o untry 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Austra lia 37.3 43.6 44 45.3 45.2 45.7 44.3 43.1 41.4
A ustria 20.7 21.6 23.2 22.9 22.7 22.4 19.9 21.1 21.9
Belgium 24.4 31.9 35.2 34 32.5 31.7 30.5 30.8 30.3
C anada 32.4 32.8 34.1 35.2 38.5 37.1 38.4 40.4 40.7
Denm ark 48.6 55.9 51.8 50.2 49.2 51 51.7 52.6 53.4
Fin land 42 48.5 44.7 47 45.4 46.2 45.3 46.8 48.5
France 12 12.3 12.9 12.8 12.8 12 11.8 11.8 13.5
G erm any 26.7 30 29.6 28.7 29.1 28.9 29.5 27.6 27.1
G reece 9.7 8.9 14.9 13.9 12.6 14 13.3 14.5 12.5
Iceland 19.9 20.2 23.1 19.5 20.7 23.8 24.2 26.5 26.4
Ire land 18.3 25.2 32 31.3 34.7 34.8 31.7 32 32,3
Italy 10.9 15.2 23.1 26.7 26.3 26.8 26.7 26.3 26.4
Japan 21.5 23.9 24.3 24.7 24.1 23.2 24.7 26.8 26.9
Luxem burg 24.1 27.8 26.8 26.3 24.8 23.7 23 24.1 22.2
Holland 26.8 27.1 26.3 19.4 19.6 20.5 21.3 24.7 26.2
New Zealand 42.7 54.3 61.6 59.8 49.9 50.9 46.7 46.4 45
N orw ay 35.2 31.5 28 22.3 26.4 27.9 27.4 25.8 25.7
Portuguese 13.9 15.9 17.8
Spa in 11.5 14.5 20.4 19.7 21.4 21.5 22.8 21.7 23.4
Sw eden 49.8 46". 1 41 38.5 37.1 38.8 39.2 37.9 34.2
Sw itzeriand 33.2 36.1 35.6 34.9 34.1 34.2 33.5 34.3 34.3
Turkey 27 32.9 43.5 27.5 24.9 23.8 26.4 26.8 28.7
Eng land 3 1 . i 37.9 29.8 26.5 26.6 26.6 27 28.6 28.5
U.S.A . 1 35.2 32.8 36.9 35.7 36.2 34.8 35.7 35.8 34.9
Unw eighted
Avererage;
O EC D 27.9 30.9 32.3 30.6 30.2 30.4 29.5 30.1 30.1
Europe O EC D 26.2 29.1 30.1 27.8 27.8 28.3 27.3 27.9 28.1
EEC 22.2 26.1 27.5 26.3 26.3 26.5 25.3 25.9 26.1
Source: Ministry of Finance (1993).
Table 2.4: Share of Corporate Tax in Total Tax Revenue in OECD and EEC
C ountry 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
A ustra lia 17 12.4 12.2 9.3 10.2 10.6 12.6 14.1 14.5
Austria 4.4 4.3 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.4 3.5
Belgium 6.8 7.2 5.7 6.4 6.5 6.8 6.7 6.4 6
C anada 11.3 13.6 11.6 8.2 8.2 8.4 8.4 7 5.5
Denm ark 2.6 3.1 3.2 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.2 3.2 3.3
Fin land 5.5 4.3 4.5 4 3.9 4.2 4.3 5.5 3.7
France 6.3 5.2 5.1 4.5 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.3 4.5
G erm any 5.7 4.4 5.5 6.1 5.1 5.3 5.5 4.8 4.3
G reece 1.6 3.4 3.8 2.7 4.5 4 4.6 5.6 4.5
Iceland 2 2.6 2.5 3.1 2.2 2.7 3 2.8 2.6
Ire land 8.8 4.8 4.5 3.2 3.2 3.8 3.4 5 5.9
Italy 6.5 6.3 7.8 9.2 10.5 9.4 10 10 9.6
Japan 26.3" 20.6 21.8 21 23 24.7 24.3 21.5 20
Luxem burg 19.3 15.7 16.5 18.3 16.8 16.8 17.4 16.2 15.5
Holland 6.7 7.7 6.6 7 7.8 7.3 7.2 7.5 7.3
New Zealand 17.8 11.8 7.8 8.3 8.9 7.9 9.1 6.4 7
N orw ay 3.3 2.8 13.3 17 6.6 5.6 5.3 8.9 9.7
Portuguese 3.9 7.4 8.4
Spa in 8.2 6.9 5.1 5.2 6.7 6.5 8.6 8.8 7.7
Sw eden 4 .4" 4.3 2.5 3.5 4.1 5.2 3.8 3.1 3.1
Sw itzerland 7.6 7.7 5.8 6 6.3 6.7 6.4 6.7 6.3
Turkey 6.4 5.1 4.1 9.5 10.7 10.5 9.6 6.7 6.1
England 9.1 6.7 8.3 12.6 10.5 10.7 12.2 11 8.9
U.S.A. 12.7 10.8 10.2 7.1 8.1 8.4 8.5 7.4 7.3
Avererage:
O EC D 8.7 7.5 7.5 7.9 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.3
Europe O EC D 6.4 5.7 6 7 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.8 6.4
EEC 7.4 6.5 6.6 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.6i 7.2
Source: Ministry of Finance (1993).
Table 2.5: Share oi Taxes on Wealth In Total Tax Revenue in OECD and EEC
C o untry 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
A ustra lia 11 8.8 7.8 7.8 9.2 9.7 8.8 9 9.8
A ustria 3.7 3.1 2.9 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7
Belgium 3 2.3 2.4 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.5
C anada 13 9.5 9.1 9.3 8.8 9 9 9.2 9.5
Denm ark 6 5.9 5.7 4.2 5.1 4.7 4.4 4.2 3.7
Fin land 2.3 2.1 2.1 3 3.2 3.6 3.9 2.8 2.7
Frdnce 3.5 3.4 3.5 4.4 4.7 5 5.1 5.3 5.8
G erm any 4.9 3.9 3.3 3 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.4 2.8
G reece 9.3 9.7 4.6 2.7 2.6 3 3.4 4.8 3.8
Iceland 4,5 5.1 6.3 7.3 7.7 7.3 8 8.5 8.8
Ire land 12.2 9.7 5,3 4 4.4 4 4.8 4.7 4.6
Italy 6 3.3 3.7 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.5
Japan 7.6 9.1 8.2 9.7 11.2 11.1 10.2 9 9.3
Luxem burg 6.6 5.1 5.7 5.7 6.7 7.5 8.2 8.5 7.6
Holland 3.3 2.4 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.6 3.6
New Zealand 10.41 9.2 7,9 7,4 6.3 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.2
N orw ay 2.4 2.3 1.7 1.9 2.4 2.8 2,9 2.9 2.9
Portuguese 4.2 2.5 1.4 1.9 2 1.9 1.5 2.4 2.4
Spain 6.5 6.3 4.6 3.5 3.7 5.3 5.1 5.5 5.1
Sw eden 1.5 1.1 0.9 2.3 5.7 3.1 3.3 3.5 4.1
Sw itzerland 8.8 7.1 7.3 8.2 8.5 8.3 8.7 7.8 7.2
Turkey 10.8 6.9 5.4 4.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.2
England 12.4 12.7 12 11.9 13.2 12.8 12.4 8.8 8.2
U.S.A. 13.6 13.2 10.1 10.1 10.2 10.4 10.3 10.8 11.2
Avererage:
O EC D 7 6 5.2 5.1 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.4
Europe O EC D 5.9 5 4.3 4.1 4.6 4.5 4.7 4,6 4.4
EEC 6.6 5.6 4.7 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.4
Source: Ministry of Finance (1993).
Table 2.6:Specigl Exemption in Income Taxation
Years
Nominal
Exemption
(TL/year)
Real
Exemption
Real Exemption 
index
(base year: 1981)
1981 54000 54000 100
1982 54000 41186 76.3
1983 54000 31355 58.1
1984 54000 21130 39.1
1985 54000 14580 27
1986 72000 14443 20
1987 72000 10401 19.3
1988 144000 11861 21.9
1989 216000 10897 20.1
1990 432000 13596 25.1
1991 648000 12287 22.7
1992 108000 12401 22.3
1993 1800000 11790 21.8
Source: Various issues of Turkish Officiai Newspaper
Table 2.7 The Exemptions in Corporate Taxation (billion TL)
Exemptions 1985 1986 1987 1988
Dividend Payments 52.8 30.2 141.8 235.7
Export of Industrial Products 137.5 199.4 659.4 1553.6
Export of Agricultural Products 14.8 34.4 25.4 29
Tourism 7.1 29.6 54.7 69.3
Investment 99.7 322.7 671.1 1185.9
Fund of Finance 12.6 55.3 316.6 121.6
Others 268.3 975.9 1404.5 1268.7
Total 592.8 1647.2 3273.5 4481.8
Source:TOBB(1992), p.l23
Table 2.8: Tax Loss and Effective Rates in Corporate Tax
(billion TL) 1985 1986 1987 1988
Pre-exemption Corporate Protit(l) 2545 4412 7175 10615
Total Exemption (2) 593 1647 3274 4482
Collected Corporate Tax (3) 600 1201 1568 2240
Tax Loss (4) 273 758 1506 2062
Exemption/Profit (%) (2)/(l) 23.3 37.3 45.6 42.2
Effective Tax Rate (%) (3)/(l) 23.5 27.2 21.8 21.1
Tax Loss (%) (4)/(3) 45.5 63.1 96 92
Source: Oyan, O. & A. Aydin (1992).
3 Taxes on Income
3.1 Introduction
In Turkey, taxes on income include income and corporate taxes. Income tax is 
levied on wage and salaries, the first sale of agricultural products, rental and 
interest earnings and the non-corporate earnings that are taxed according to the 
declared level. Corporate taxation is for the corporate profits. As we have 
observed in Part 2, taxes on income have the highest weight within the total tax 
revenue. Therefore, it is particularly important to analyze the distributional 
considerations of taxes on income. In this part, we will concentrate our analysis 
on two basic points;
1. The degree of progressivity of income tax system,
2. The redistributive effects of the taxes on income (both income and 
corporate tax)
3.2 The Degree of Progressivity of Income Taxation 
3.2.1 How Progressive Should Income Tax Be?
Most people support tax progressivity due to the assumption that ability to pay 
increases more than proportionately with income*. But there has never been an 
easy receipt to determine an optimal level for progressivity. What makes it 
hard to define a receipt, is usually the disagreement about the assumptions on 
the behavioral response of households to taxation and the nature of inequality 
in the society. The optimal tax system depends on the assumptions of the 
analytical model which in turn depend on the normative judgments. The 
answers to the following questions are critical in these terms: What is the effect 
of different assumptions about the elasticity of labor supply response to 
taxation, the specification of the social welfare function, social cost of 
inequality in the distribution of income and resources?
The typical model in the modem literature is Mirlees' formulation where the 
government maximizes some social welfare function that is a function of the 
level of welfare of each household subject to raising some target amount of 
total tax revenue®. The tax structure effect the labor-leisure decisions of the 
households. Thus high marginal tax rates may reduce households' supply of 
labor and in turn total output and tax revenue.
The social welfare function answers questions about the normative 
judgments of the society such as fairness and equity. More egalitarian social 
welfare functions lead to more progressive optimal income tax schemes.
*Musgrave, R.A. and P.B. Musgrave (1973), pp. 198-204. 
®Mirlees, J. (1971).
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Important questions are how much of national income the society is willing 
sacrifice in order to achieve a more equal distribution of income and what the 
social value of an additional unit of income to individuals with different level 
of income is. According to one extreme answer to such questions, the optimal 
tax scheme may even be extremely regressive if the society does not care for 
distributional aspects at all.
The initial distribution of resources is also important. As the inequality 
within the initial distribution increases, the social gains from a redistributive 
tax system will increase.
3.2.2 How Does Progressivity Effect Tax Revenue?
The behavioral response function determines the degree of labor supply 
response to change in tax rates. With a more responsive behavioral function, 
the efficiency cost of redistributive tax systems increases. This is one of the 
most debatable aspect of the empirical studies in optimal tax literature. 
Pechman reports that historical trends in US. labor supply are not consistent 
with the finding that taxes have reduced work effort‘s. He further argues that 
studies in other countries are not reliable enough to support conclusions about 
the relationship between taxes and labor supply, and the strongest conclusion 
he draws from the available evidence is that the incentive effects of taxation 
have been relatively small. Thus, under the circumstances, so long as the tax 
rates are not pushed to very extreme levels like 100%, incentive considerations 
don't justify the neglecting of the distributional objective of tax policy.
This discussion brings us to the relationship between tax progressivity and 
tax revenue. At this point, there are two separate lines of reasoning. The first is 
based on the welfare costs of income taxation that arise from tax payers' work- 
leisure decisions. Thus the impact of progressive taxes on tax revenue is 
determined by the relative strength of the offsetting income and substitution 
effects between work and leisure. Assuming leisure to be a normal good, for a 
community of identical individuals, a progressive income tax will generate less 
revenue than a proportional income tax with the same average rate according to 
welfare theory. This is because, the income effect that positively effects the 
leisure decision is determined by the average tax rate, whereas the substitution 
effect that negatively effects the leisure choice is determined by the marginal 
tax rate. In a progressive tax scheme marginal rate always exceeds the average 
rate; thus the substitution effect offsets income effect and labor supply is lower 
with a progressive tax structure. However, the validity of this theory depends 
on labor response function. We will try to analyze the situation for Turkey in 
the following pages.
The result of the welfare theory is ambiguous for a community of different 
individuals. It depends upon individual marginal rates of substitution. Thus this
*®Pechman, A. (1990), p.7.
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is an empirical matter. If the income elasticity for leisure is high for high 
income individuals, then progressive tax structure generates more revenue.
The second line of reasoning is within the framework of public choice 
theory that concentrates on the decisions made by voters and governments. 
Brennan and Buchanan builds a model for a single individual community 
where the revenue maximizing government can "walk down" the tax payers' 
demand curve like first-degree monopoly price discrimination". Within the 
paradigm of Leviathan government, tax revenue maximization results in a 
regressive tax scheme where the government converts the consumer surplus 
into tax revenue. Here again, when the model is expanded to a community of 
different individuals, the effects of progressive and proportional income taxes 
on tax revenue depend on individual elasticities.
Another approach within the public choice framework is the median voter 
approach, which discusses how the structure of a tax system effects the voting 
decisions about public budgets. Buchanan argues that, with progressive taxes 
average tax paid by the median voter falls as the average tax paid by the high 
income individual rises and therefore the median voter will select a larger 
public budget (higher tax revenue requirement for the government) under a 
more progressive tax structure*-. Contrary to this "average cost share" 
approach, Brennan develops another approach based on marginal cost shares* .^ 
Progressive taxes raise the marginal cost share of the median voter, then at the 
margin the median voter prefers a smaller public budget the more the level of 
progression is. Thus, if the average tax is held constant, the progressivity of the 
tax system should be negatively related to revenue.
Hunter and Scott build a theoretical model to test the relationship of 
progressivity and revenue generation based on the median voter theorem'·*. The 
results of their empirical test using data from the forty states, show that Gini 
coefficient (an index of system progressivity of the income taxes), average tax 
rate for the median income individual and the unemployment rate have a 
statistically significant effect on the level of tax revenue. Raising the average 
tax rate increases the tax revenue whereas unemployment level negatively 
effects revenue generation. However, the Gini index has a negative coefficient, 
thus increasing the degree of progressivity, holding the average tax rate 
constant, leads to lower levels of tax revenue, ceteris paribus.
"Brennan, G. and J. M. Buchanan (1980). 
' “Buchanan, J.M. (1964).
'^Brennan, G. (1977).
' ‘‘Hunter, W. J. and C. E. Scott (1987).
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In this section, we will report some of the results of the general model of 
Mirlees due to different assumptions about the social welfare function, initial 
distribution of endowments and behavioral response of individuals.
Sadka argued that as long as there is a finite upper bound to the income 
distribution and as long as the welfare of the most well off individual in society 
carries some positive weight in the social welfare function, the marginal tax 
rate at the top of the income scale should be zero‘d. This is intuitively 
explained by the idea that the highest earning household is better off under the 
zero marginal tax rate, works more and gives a higher amount of tax on the 
average and all other individuals are at least as well off. They may be strictly 
better off, if the increased tax revenue is spent to develop a progressive public 
finance structure. Although this result is striking in showing that playing with 
the tax rates isn't the only way for achieving an egalitarian fiscal structure, it 
has received many criticisms. Mirlees argues that zero is a bad approximation 
to the optimal tax rates at the top“^ . Seade reports that decreasing the marginal 
rates to zero at the top, improves the matters only by raising the well-being of 
a very small group of people who are at the very top'"^ .
Mirlees, using a simple utilitarian social welfare function, a lognormal 
distribution of ability and an identical Cobb-Douglas utility function of goods 
and leisure for each individual, found an approximately linear optimal tax 
structure where marginal tax rate is constant and there is an exemption level 
below which tax liability is negative. Due to the presence of exemption level, 
tax liability increases with income and there is some level of progressivity. In 
this model marginal tax rates were between 20-30% and usually lower than 
40%. He also found that increasing the dispersion of skills increased the 
optimal tax rates but not to a great extent.
Atkinson,explored the effect of increasing the egalitarianism of the social 
welfare flmction. Even in the extreme case of the maximin social welfare 
function, the model generated optimal tax rates not much higher than 50%*“.
Stem suggested that more egalitarian social welfare functions and less 
substitutability imply much higher marginal tax rates*'·'. In Stem's case, the 
optimal marginal tax rate of a linear tax system is 54%. The Cobb-Douglas 
response function with an elasticity of substitution of one for leisure is not a 
reasonable estimate of labor supply responsiveness in real life according to 
him.
3.2.3 Optimal Income Tax Rates
*5Sadka, E. (1976). 
'^Mirlees, J. (1976). 
‘■'Seade, J. (1977). 
*“Atkinson, A. (1973). 
ii»Steni, N. (1976).
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Further discussion about the scheme arises due to the introduction of 
uncertainty to the model. If there is income uncertainty which is uncorrelated 
across individuals and for which private insurance markets don't exist, then 
taxation becomes some form of social insurance-“. Moreover, now the optimal 
marginal tax rate at the highest level is likely to be high, because under 
uncertainty high level of income is probably due to the random component of 
income and taxing an income highly due to random effects will have minimal 
disincentive effects.
The standard optimal taxation model is one-period. But in a long-run 
context, the social welfare function must contain information about the relative 
social valuation of income received by individuals who are alive at different 
periods in time. In such a long-run context, the efficiency cost of taxation 
increases, because substitution effect is now not only for leisure but also for 
future-present consumption decisions. As the efficiency cost increases due to 
such considerations, the optimal level of progressivity will be decreased. Also 
adopting a lifetime perspective is important for the measurement of the 
redistributive impact of a given tax system. An apparently redistributive tax 
system may be merely transferring income among time periods without 
materially transferring income between households. Attention must be paid to 
the transmission of wealth mechanism, including the role of gifts, inheritances 
and marriage patterns-'.
3.2.4 Measures of Progression
In general a tax scheme is progressive if the average tax rate rises when 
moving up the income scale, proportional if the average tax rate is constant and 
regressive if the rate declines. But this general definition does not tell us much 
about the degree of progressivity; thus the changes in the slope of the average 
tax rate curve.
There are basically three methods of measuring the degree of 
progressivity--:
1. Average rate progression:
This measure refers to structural progress!vity-^. It measures the ratio of 
change in average rate to change in income. According to this concept the tax 
is progressive when the average rate of tax increases as a function of taxable 
income. For discrete income intervals, the formula for average rate progression 
coefficient is as follows:
-“Diamond, Hermes and Mirlees (1980). 
Eaton, J. and H. Rosen (1981),
Varian, H. (1980).
-'Slemrod, J. (1983).
^“Musgrave... pp.261-263.
“^Schueler, M. and C. Terry (1983), p.83.
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Average Rate Progression=(T,/Y, - T /Y J  / (Y, - Y„),
where T_= tax liability for level,
Y= income for level i.
The value of the coefficient is zero for a proportional tax and positive for 
progression.
2. Liability progression:
This measure refers to system progressivity-·*. It measm"es the ratio of 
percentage change in liability to percentage change in income; thus the 
elasticity of tax liability with respect to income. System progressivity reflects 
the incentives within the tax system-^. For discrete time intervals the formula 
for this measure is as follows:
Liability progression coefficient=( T, - T„)/ T^  / (Y, - YJ/Y^
The value of the coefficient is one for a proportional tax and greater than 
one for progression. Thus the percentage change in tax liability is more than 
percentage change in income if the system is progressive.
3. Residual income progression:
This measure refers to effective progressivity-^*. It measures the ratio of 
percentage change in after tax income to percentage change in before tax 
income; thus the elasticity of after tax income with respect to before tax 
income. For discrete income intervals, the formula is given by;
Residual income progression coefficient=((Y,-T,)-(Y„-T„))/(Y„-TJ/(Y, -Y„)/Y„
The value of the coefficient is one for a proportional tax and less than one 
for progression. Thus the percentage difference in after tax income is less than 
the percentage difference in before tax income for progression. Residual 
income progression coefficient is an equity measure of the distribution of tax 
burden.
These different measures give different aspects of the level of progression. 
For example, if all average tax rates are increased by an equal percent, liability 
progression stays constant and average rate progression and residual income 
progression fall. If all average tax rates are raised by an equal number of 
percentage points, then average tax progression remains constant and liability 
and residual income progression fall. The first type of rate increase is 
preferable for low and the second for high incomes-’. Thus the definition of 
neutrality isn't independent from different measures of tax distribution.
3.2.5 Developments in the Turkish Income Tax System
In Turkey, the income tax system that was adopted in 1963 continued until 
1981 without any change. In this first system, there were 10 income tax
“■’Hunter and Scott (1987), p.l97. 
’^ibid...
-’Musgrave... p.263.
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brackets and the marginal tax rates raged between 10% and 68% where the 
marginal rate for the top bracket was 60%.
After 1980, the, tax system has changed every year. Table 3.1 shows the 
income tax system from 1963 to 1993-**. In 1981 the lowest marginal tax rate 
was increased upto 40% and the highest rate was 75% whereas the top income 
bracket was taxed at 66% at the margin. Moreover the number of brackets was 
reduced to 7. Indeed the system in 1981 has grouped the first 10 brackets of the 
previous system within a single tax bracket. Because of the erosin due to 
inflation the lower tax brackets had already become irrelevant by 1980; the tax 
reform in 1981 only prepared a law to fit to this fact. This is a negative 
development in terms of tax equity. From 1981 to 1985 the tax rates for the 
first bracket have been lowered each year and finally dropped down to 25%. 
But the marginal tax rate for the highest bracket also decreased to 63%.
The changes in the marginal tax rates after 1981 have caused losses in tax 
revenue rather than gains. The big initial change in 1981 has caused the largest 
loss of 1.45% of GDP. In 1982 the reduction in rates initially caused a small 
increase in tax revenues by 0.16% of GDP. But this didn't last long and 
between 1983 and 1985, the loss of revenue ranged from 0.99% to 0.40% of 
GDP-*'. The decrease in tax revenue is a combined effect of the fall in the 
average rates for all income brackets. The degree of progression increases in 
this period and here we partially analyze the trade off between degree of 
progression and tax revenue. But this is only a partial result about the decrease 
in tax revenue, because the decrease in the effectiveness of the tax collection 
mechanism in this period is also one of the reasons that contribute to the 
decrease in tax revenue. In the following pages we will also analyze the 
response of the highest bracket to decreasing average tax rates to see how the 
welfare theory applies to our case.
At this point it is important to observe effective tax rates that will show the 
ratio of the collected tax to the tax base for each income group. This indicates 
the effectiveness of the mechanism to collect the realized revenue. These 
figures that were being published formerly in the Bulletin of Tax Revenue by 
the Ministry of Finance and Customs are not being published since 1983. But a 
study made by the World Bank in 1987 for Turkey uses such figures for 1980 
and 1986. We will use this report to analyze the effective tax rates for different 
income groups^“. Table 3.2 shows the effective rates for each income group 
between 1980 and 1986.
The report uses the income levels declared by the tax payers as the tax base. 
But since there always is a probability of false declaration, there is some level 
of over estimation for the effective rates.
“*Note that additional income tax brackets are added above the top income bracket to point at 
the convergence of average and marginal rates after a certain level of income.
"^World Bank (1987), p.36.
^^ ibid...
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If we assume that the declared base is the true base, we observe that the 
effective rates are in general lower than the legal rates and this is an important 
failure in Turkish tax structure in terms of the inability of collecting the tax on 
the declared level of income. When we approach the problem from the view 
point of income groups, we observe that the effective rates for lower income 
groups are very close to the legal rates with small differences of at most 2-3 
percentage points. But for the higher income groups the difference increases 
upto 20 percentage points, especially in 1983. In 1981 the legal rate was 66% 
at the top whereas the effective rate was only 47%. In 1986 the difference 
between legal and effective rates was 10%. This proves that in terms of 
effective rates the degree of progression of the tax structure is much lower than 
supposed to be. The tax payers with low income are usually wage earners and 
the tax on their income is taken directly before their wage is paid. But for 
higher income tax payers the government cannot collect the legal amount of 
tax on the declared level of income that easily.
The change in the tax amount paid at the highest income bracket as the 
average tax rate decreases at the top is also an important issue. The data at 
hand allows for such an analysis of the labor responsiveness at the top bracket 
only for the period between 1980 and 1986. Table 3.3 shows the real mount of 
tax paid at the top bracket and the elasticity of tax base to average tax rate. The 
real amount of tax paid at the top decreases 440% in 1981 due to the increase 
in the tax rate and the elasticity was quite high - 8 in absolute terms. Thus the 
highest income individuals decreased either labor supply or declaration. Of 
course the reduction in tax base is not simply a result of increased tax rates. 
The ratio of percentage increase in tax liability to percentage decrease in tax 
rate is 6.7 in 1982. This shows a high level of responsiveness and also the real 
amount of tax collected at the top bracket increases by 13% although the 
average rate is lower. In 1984 the elasticity of tax base to tax rate decreases 
down to 2.5 where there is a reduction of 5% in average rate. The real amount 
of tax revenue still increases by 12% due the increase in tax base and in spite 
of the decrease in tax rate. Between 1981 and 1984 the labor response at the 
top satisfies the theorem about the optimal tax scheme saying that tax paid at 
the top level increases due to a reduction in the average tax rate. However the 
responsiveness of the highest income individual to tax rates decreases as we 
further decrease the average tax rate in 1985 by another 5%. Real tax base 
decreases in 1985 even though the rate decreases. This fiulher decreases the tax 
collected at the top due to the combined effect of lower tax rate and tax base. 
The situation is similar in 1986. The ratio of percentage decrease in tax base to 
the percentage decrease in tax base is 0.11 and 8.79 in 1985 and 1986 
respectively. The tax revenue collected at the top decreases by 3% and 79% 
respectively in these years. It is also important to note that the degree of 
progression decreases for the higher income levels between 1981, 1985 and 
1986. Thus, the tax scheme in 1985 makes the richer better off but increases
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the level of tax collected from the rich as well. But the scheme in 1986 neither 
brings out an increase in degree of progression nor increases the tax revenue at 
the top. Thus, it is neither optimal nor progressive relative to the other years. 
This basically because the number of tax brackets decreases to 6 and the top 
marginal rate decreased to 50% in 1986, also the tax brackets were adjusted 
such that the tax base at the top bracket decreased.
Beginning with 1986 the number of tax brackets and the marginal tax rates 
for the brackets didn't change until 1994. The marginal tax rates increased at 
5% at each bracket starting from 25% and reaching to 50% at the top bracket. 
The tax brackets doubled at each level. Between 1986 and 1993, only the 
income brackets were adjusted to catch up with the inflation rate, at least to 
some extent.
By the latest adjustments in 1994, the number of tax brackets again 
increased to 7. The width of the lowest bracket, which was taxed at 25% at the 
margin, increased. Thus, the 32 million TL limit for the lowest bracket 
increased by 134% to 75 million TL. The marginal tax rate for the top bracket 
also increased to 55%.
If we compare the income tax rates at the bottom and top brackets in OECD 
and EEC countries with Turkey, we observe a general tendency in those 
countries to lower the tax rate for the first bracket^'. But in Turkey the rate 
increased by 2.5% for the first bracket from 1963 to 1994.
On the other hand, it is a general tendency to decrease the marginal tax rates 
for the top bracket in OECD and EEC countries. But this doesn't cause a 
reduction in tax revenue in those countries whereas in Turkey the low rates at 
the top bracket decrease not only the level of tax equity but also the tax 
revenue of government^*. Our analysis also for 1985 and 1986 supports this 
result.
Another important effect that increases the tax burden on the lower income 
brackets is the bracket creep due to inflation. The tax brackets are relatively 
narrower at lower income levels and they get broader as income increases. Tax 
payers with lower income step upto higher brackets faster than those with 
higher income, especially because the width of the first income bracket does 
not increase as fast as inflation^^. Moreover, since the tax rates are constant 
above a certain level of income, the very high income levels don't carry any 
inflation tax burden at all.
3.2.6 The Change in the Degree of Progression
In this part we will evaluate the degree of progression in Turkish income tax 
system from 1963 to the present. This discussion is not an answer to the
3’?ener, O. (1990), pp.66-68.
32ibid...
33TOBB (1992), pp.121-122.
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optimal tax scheme problem. In order to be able to answer such a problem, we 
first of all need data about the labor response functions which are quite hard to 
obtain in a country where there are many factors changing all together and 
effecting the level of labor supply. Also here we do not answer normative 
questions like, "What are the preferences of Turkish citizens about inequality 
in distribution of in come?" Rather, we will stand at another "normative" side 
to critisize how the degree of progression of income tax system changed and 
what are the opportunities for a more progressive tax system to increase 
equality in after tax distribution of income.
To apply the measures of the degree of progression on Turkish income tax 
structure through years, we have to calculate the real income brackets in order 
to free the analysis from the effects of fiscal illusion due to inflation ·^*. Column 
4 and 5 in Table 3.1 shows the real income brackets for years 1963 and 1980- 
1993. Figures 3.1-3.15 illustrate the average and marginal tax rates with 
respect to real income tax brackets.
At a first glance, the average tax rates increase as we move up the income 
scale in all years (See Column 7 in Table 3.1). But this is just a very general 
evaluation of progression. The fall in the degree of progression is striking 
between 1963 and 1980 if we observe the income tax scale which is much 
lower in 1980 for each level of average tax rate (See Figiae 3.1 and 3.2). In 
1981 the steepness of the ciuve decreases to a great e.xtent (See Figure 3.3). 
For a detailed analysis we need average rate, liability and residual income 
progression coefficients, which can be seen in columns 8 to 10 respectively in 
Table 3.1.
Average rate progression is effected from both the changes in real tax 
brackets, thus the inflation and the marginal tax scheme. Therefore it is a better 
sign to see how the degree of progression changes between years where 
marginal tax rates are constant and only the adjustments in real brackets are 
effective. We can also use this coefficient to see how the degree of progression 
changed through income brackets within the same year. In all years, generally 
average rate progression decreases as we move up the income scale. The 
coefficient reaches to zero where the average rate and the marginal rates 
converge. In real terms the level where the tax system became proportional 
was 100 million TL in 1963 and this decreased to 5 million in 1980. This level 
was 92 million in 1981 which was still lower than 1963. During 1981 and 1984 
these figures are 141 and 144 respectively. In 1982 the reason for increased 
progression was the increased difference between average tax rates which were 
39% and 65% for bottom and top brackets. Later the degree of progression 
decreased in 1983 due to the erosion in the fixed tax brackets through years. In 
1984 there was a recovery in the degree of progression due to the increased
convert nominal income to real income we used the CPI in the IMF International 
Financial Statistics Year Book, 1993 where 1985 is the base year. Still, we have to point at the 
inadequacy of the CPI to account for different inflation rates for different income groups.
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difference between bottom and top marginal tax rates which were 30% and 
60% respectively. The shift to a proportional scheme starts above 100 million 
TL in 1985 which is a shift back to 1963. The adjustment in brackets in 1986 
increased this figure upto 285 million TL. This figure declined continually 
until 1989 where the level was 143 million TL in real terms. This shows that 
the tax system couldn't catch up with increasing level of inflation. In 1990 
there was another recovery, where the shift to proportional scheme started at a 
level above 240 million TL. Then until 1993, this figure again decreased 
continually down to 200 million TL. The changes between 1986 and 1993 are 
important because in this period marginal and average tax rates were constant 
and the differences in the degree of progression are only due to inflation.
When we observe the development of liability progression coefficient, we 
see that the degree of progression increases for the first few income brackets 
and then it decreases sharply as we move up the income scale. Thus, the high 
income individuals are taxed less progressively than individuals below middle 
income level. This is not a positive sign for progressivity.
Liability progression coefficient depends on the average tax rates and the 
nominal income level. So this measure is free of the effects of inflation. 
Therefore it is a measure of progression of tax liability due to changes in 
nominal income. According to this measure the degree of progression 
increased between 1981 and 1985 due to the change in tax rates in this period. 
Liability progression stayed constant after 1986 where the average tax rate 
scheme and the percentage increase of income tax brackets did not change 
through years.
Residual income progression is an important measure to point at the effect 
of tax system on the after tax distribution of income. The residual income 
progression coefficient also follows a similar path to liability progression. Thus 
the redistributive effects of the tax system first increase as we move up the 
brackets, then the difference between before and after tax income gets smaller 
after a certain level of income, thus the tax system becomes proportional.
Changes in brackets and rates after 1985 did not have any effect on residual 
income progression, thus the changes did not bring more equality in the 
redistributive sense. This result is also valid for liability progression.
It is also important to note that, between 1986 and 1993 the changes in the 
tax scales took place without any change in average tax rates. Since the 
brackets were not adopted completely with respect to inflation, real income 
levels corresponding to these constant rates gradually decreased each year. 
Thus the tax burden increased for each level of real income because of the lack 
of full adjustment to inflation. As we have already pointed at in Part 2, low 
income earners are effected more by this result.
It will be meaningful to compare the final point, where the residual income 
progression coefficient begins to increase for ever (thus, the point where 
residual income progression begins to decline). This corresponds to the point
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where the average tax rates become very close to the marginal tax rates. (This 
point can be observed in Figures 3.1 - 3.15). Table 3.4 shows the income 
levels corresponding to these levels for each year. The comparison of these 
numbers shows the decreased distributive justice from 1963 on, openly. The 
after tax distribution of income was much more equal than the before tax 
distribution of income in 1963 for a wide income range. The degree of 
progression begins to decline at a very low level of income in 1980. The tax 
reform in 1981 also could not catch the initial level. Since the nominal brackets 
were constant, the effect of inflation in the period between 1981 and 1985 
offset the positive effects of changes made in the tax rate. In 1985 the decrease 
occurred at an income level above 25 million TL. In 1986 this amount 
increased to 71 million TL. But until 1993 it decreased gradually down to 25 
million TL. Thus the tax system begins to be approximately neutral in 
redistributive sense above an income level of 25 million TL in 1993.
We can have a detailed comparison if group the real brackets together for 
two years; in this way we can see the degree of progression for the same real 
income bracket in different years.
First, we compare 1963 and 1981 to see the decline in progression clearly. 
Figure 3.16 shows the average tax rates for 1963 and 1981 for each real 
income tax bracket. Until an income level of 26.5 million TL the average rates 
are higher in 1981; this also means that the tax system is more progressive in 
1963 than 1981 at low and middle income levels. This is due to the increased 
tax rates and also the decrease in the number of tax brackets. But the degree of 
progression is higher in 1981 than 1963 for higher income brackets. This is 
basically due to the increased average tax rates at the upper levels of income. 
Table 3.5 shows the coefficients for the degree of progression for these years.
Second, we will compare 1981 and 1985 to observe the effect of the 
decrease in tax brackets. As it is also seen in Figure 3.17, the average tax rates 
are higher in 1981 for all levels of income, although the nominal tax brackets 
were not adjusted in this period. The degree of progression is higher in 1985 at 
the low and middle income levels and lower at high income levels when 
compared to 1981. This is due to the fall in average tax rates at the top from 
66% to 55% in 1985. Table 3.6 shows the coefficients for the degree of 
progression for these years.
Third, we will compare 1985 and 1986. This comparison is particularly 
important because we will see the effect of the decrease in the number of tax 
brackets from 7 to 6 in 1986, the decrease in average tax rates and the 
adjustment in tax brackets. The average tax rates are higher in 1985 than 1986 
for all income levels (See Figure 3,18). Till an income level of 25 million, the 
tax system is more progressive in 1985. This bracket was the seventh, thus 
final bracket in 1986. Since in 1986, the tax brackets were adjusted with 
respect to inflation, the tax scheme protected its progressive structure also at 
the higher levels of income when compared with 1985, in spite of the decrease
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in the number of tax brackets. The decrease in tax rates from the second 
bracket onwards decreased the degree of progression. The decrease in 
progression that could have resulted due to the decrease in the number of tax 
brackets and the average tax rate at the top, was offset by the adjustment in the 
tax brackets to catch up with inflation, at least when compared with 1985 (See 
Table 3.7).
Finally, we will compare 1963 with 1993 to see the overall change in the 
degree of progressivity. The average tax rates are lower in 1963 for income 
levels above 5.5 million TL, which is the middle tax bracket in 1963. 
Contrarily, the average rates are higher above this level. Thus, the average tax 
rate scheme is steeper than the average rate curve in 1993 for all income levels. 
As a result the degree of progression is higher in 1963 than that in 1993 
according to all measures of income (See Figure 3.19 and Table 3.8).
It is important to note that only the rearrangement of income brackets to 
recover some of the damage caused by inflation is not enough to increase 
fairness in the after tax distribution of income. Tax scale and the difference 
between the highest and lowest average tax rates are also important.
The changes for 1994 were planned to decrease the tax burden on the lower 
income levels by widening the first bracket and to increase the degree of 
progression by increasing the marginal tax rate at the top. However, since we 
can not get the real amounts for 1994, it is not convenient to comment on the 
changes in the degree of progression, as a whole. But we can say that the initial 
discussions to decrease the tax rate for the lowest bracket to 15% or 20% are 
important to increase the degree of progression and to decrease the tax burden 
on the poorer. Still, these are the points to be considered for an extensive tax 
reform. Moreover, there have been discussions to make the tax brackets wider 
which would decrease the tax burden on low and middle income tax payers. 
Yet, the only change about the brackets has been to increase the first bracket 
by 134% which is susceptible to catch up with the possible inflation rate at the 
end of the year.
3.3 Taxes on Income and Redistribution of Income
In order to observe the effects of taxes on redistribution of income, we can 
either use income brackets or factor income shares. However, the necessary 
data to make income brackets as the basis of analysis, is not available. On the 
basis of income brackets it is not possible to go further than the analysis on the 
degree of progression of income taxation. First of all this data base includes 
only the tax payers who are taxed on the basis of their declared income. But 
the taxes collected on the basis of declaration make up only 25% of the total 
personal taxes. Second, the distribution of taxes due to income brackets is 
officially reported only until 1980. Third, the income distribution analysis
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based on income brackets made by State Institute of Statistics in 1987 is only 
for one year.
For all these reasons, we have to analyze the distribution of effective tax 
burden on the basis of factor income groups. This will bring an additional 
dimension to the discussion that we have already made on the basis of the 
degree of progression in the income tax system. It is important to make an 
analysis on the basis of social groups that are reflected in factor income groups.
The effective tax burden is the ratio of the taxes collected from an income 
group to the net factor income for that group.
In order to calculate the effective tax burden, we first need the distribution 
of national income on the basis of factor income group. There are two studies 
on this subject. One is made by Süleyman Özmucur where national income is 
divided between three categories: agriculture, wages and salaries, and others. 
The other study is made in State Institute of Planning (SIP) by Adil Temel in 
1994 who divides national income to five categories, namely agriculture, 
wages and salary, rent, interest and others^ .^
The categorization of Süleyman Özmucur does not allow for a detailed 
analysis since the category of "others" include too many different groups. 
Therefore it is more convenient to refer to Adil Temel. In this categorization, 
the rent and interest income earning groups are also differentiated, so that the 
category of "others" include profit earning corporations and agents in general. 
But here again we have to be very careful. This category includes not only the 
big capital profits but also the small agriculturers and artisans who work on 
their own, therefore it does not correspond to a highly homogeneous group.
In the calculation of the effective tax burden, the data on hand allow only 
for a short term and static analysis. Short-run analysis is especially appropriate 
for taxes on income (especially income taxation). Because taxes on income are 
direct taxes that can show their effects in a very short period. Therefore it is 
not much problem to choose the period between 1987 and 1992, which is a 
rather short period for analysis.
Temel, uses the collected tax revenue reported in Tax Statistics Yearbook, 
rather than the realized tax revenue. This preference is made to obtain the real 
effective tax rates, not the supposed or planned rates.
Table 3.9 shows the distribution of factor income and tax revenue due to 
factor income groups.
Between 1987 and 1992, on the average agricultural sector earn 17.76% of 
the total national income whereas the same figure for wage earners is 28.23%, 
4.27% for rent, 7.96% for interest and 41.78% for others.
There is a broad basis of exemption for agricultural sector, therefore the 
share of the tax revenue collected from this income group is only 3%. The 
share of the wage and salary earning group and "others" in the tax revenue is 
larger then their share in national income. On the other hand, the share of the
î^Temel, A. (1994).
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rent and interest earning group in tax revenue is smaller than their share in 
national income.
The effective tax burden for agricultural sector ranges between 1.37% and
I. 48%. This is a very low burden with respect to all other factor income 
groups.
The effective tax burden on wages and salaries has increased from 9.6 to
I I .  19 between 1987 and 1992. The average of the period is highest for this 
group with a burden of 10.99%. This is 9.7 times higher than the burden on 
agricultural sector; 6.7 times higher than the interest earning group; 4.9 times 
higher than the rent earning group and finally 1.6 times higher than the other 
factor income groups. These differences increase as we observe the effective 
tax burden on realized tax basis, since the collection/realization ratio is higher 
for the wage earners whose tax liability is directly deduced from their wages.
When we add the tax burden due to indirect taxes (especially value-added 
tax), the effective tax burden of the wage earners increases much more, since 
this group has to spend a larger proportion of its income on consumption 
expenditure. In Part 4, we will analyze the tax burden on income groups due to 
VAT.
The effective tax burden on rent earners increased from 1.83% to 7.09% 
between 1987 and 1992 and the average is 6.13%. The effective tax burden 
interest earners also increased except for the decline in 1988 and 1991; the 
range of change is 3.82% and 5.14% where the average burden is 4.26% on 
this sector. This is the second lowest value after the agricultural sector. Also 
the increase in the tax burden from 1987 to 1992 is quite low. The effective tax 
burden on interest earners is especially low if we consider the increased share it 
has within GNP in the last years (8.21% and 9.2% in 1991 and 1992 
respectively).
The profit earning group carries an effective burden of 9.37% on the 
average. The burden decreased from its initial value of 10% in 1987 to about 
8% in years 1988 and 1990. This decrease is basically due to the increased 
basis of exemptions. The rates again increase to about 10% in 1991, but this 
increase in effective tax burden is not due to the increase in the share in tax 
revenue. Contrarily this share decreased, but the decrease in the share in factor 
income was higher so that the effective burden increased in 1991 and 1992.
It is important to observe how the taxes on income effect different income 
groups in terms of after tax distribution of income. To make this analysis, we 
first have to find the after tax distribution of income for each factor income 
group. Table 3.10 shows the results for 1987 and 1992. To see the effect of the 
taxes, we must compare before and after tax distribution of income for 
different groups. This shows the distribution of gains and losses due to 
taxation, thus the percentage changes in the share in the net national income for 
each income group after taxation. This is the ratio of difference in after and
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before tax distribution of income to the before tax distribution of income and 
shows us how much a group becomes well or worse off after taxation.
The results in Table 3.10 show that the distribution of income becomes 
worse for the wage earners and the profit earning group represented in the 
category of "others". The worst effects are again carried by the wage earning 
group. The losses of the wage earners are higher in absolute value (3.37% on 
the average) than the losses of profit earners (1.69%) and the gains of the other 
groups as well. Especially in 1989 percentage loss reached to 4.56 for this 
group. The reason for the worsening of the situation of the wage earners 
between 1988 and 1990 may be the combined effects of the after tax 
improvement in the position of the other groups and the decrease in the degree 
of progression of income tax structure between those years. Taxation causes a 
clear development in the position of the other three sectors, especially 
agricultural sector. The effect for rent earners is negative only in 1990.
The average of the distribution of gains and losses shows that taxation has a 
negative effect on working masses other than agriculturers.
3.4 Conclusion and Suggestions
Taxation has both economic and social purposes. In these aspects, taxation is a 
mean of reallocation of income and resources. As we have observed in Part 3, 
in Turkey this reallocation is to the benefit of rent and interest income earning 
groups and agricultural sector. Especially the benefits to the interest and rent 
earning groups cannot be acceptable. In such a system, taxation makes the 
distribution of income worse for the working masses.
A tax reform to overcome the inequality between effective tax burdens is 
necessary. It's also important to decrease these inequalities without effecting 
the incentives for economic development. These are critical trade-offs for 
increasing tax revenue. In Turkey, the exemptions and immunities need to be 
reconsidered in order to balance their contribution to the economic 
development and the tax loss they cause.
Such a reform may result in an increasing tax burden on the corporate 
sector. As the results in Table 3.10 show, the burden on the group who earn 
corporate and personal profit is already high and their loss due to taxation is 
2.12%. But still it must be considered that this group is not homogeneous and 
it's highly probable that the losses are mostly received by small entrepreneurs 
who cannot benefit from exemptions. Given the large base of exemptions and 
immunities in corporate taxation where the tax loss reaches to 90% of the 
corporate tax revenue (see Table-1.8), it's important to reconsider the means of 
increasing the tax burden in corporate sector to be able to achieve a more fair 
after tax distribution of income.
A possible suggestion to achieve a more acceptable distribution of tax 
burden is put forward by the research made in State Institute of Planning by
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Adil Temel. It's suggested to increase the tax burden on all the factor income 
groups other than agriculture sector and wage and salary earning group. In 
three different alternatives, it's suggested to increase the tax burden on these 
groups by 1, 2 and 3 points above the average burden in 1991 and 1992. Thus 
the effective tax burden on rent income earning group increases from 7.5% to 
8.5, 9.5 and 10.5 respectively. The increase for interest income earning group 
is from 4.9% to 5.9, 6.9 and 7.9% respectively. The increase for the corporate 
and other profit earning group is from 10.4% to 11.4, 12.4 and 13.4% 
respectively. This increases the total effective burden on these groups from 
9.1% to 10.05% in the first alternative, 11.05% in the second alternative and 
12.05% in the third alternative. The average burden for these groups in the 
second alternative hardly reaches the burden on wage and salary income 
earning group. The results are shown in Table-3.11.
These increases in tax burden will bring out a real increase in the income 
tax revenues of 3.5%, 8.83% and 14.16% respectively.^*  ^ This is a static 
analysis where it's assumed that elasticities of tax revenues with respect to rates 
is one. According to this static analysis, the third alternative will bring about an 
increase of 11285.7 billion TL in the total tax revenue of 1992. This increase 
would bring out a decrease in the debt necessities of the Consolidated Budget 
by 24%.37
We analyzed how the proposals stated by the research of Adil Temel 
effects the after tax distribution of income. Table 3.11 shows the results of 
increasing the effective tax rates for three factor income groups and the 
distribution of gains and losses due to income taxation.
The changes bring out a decrease in the losses of the wage and salary 
earning group by an increasing degree for each alternative. In the third 
alternative, the losses decreased from 2.66% to 1.18% for 1992. The situation 
of agricultural sector becomes much better. The gains of the rent income 
earning group decreased from 1.84% to 0.62 and 0.03% respectively. Finally 
the third alternative created a loss of 0.56% for this group in terms of after tax 
distribution of income. The gains of the interest income earning group was still 
2.39% in the third alternative. The losses of the "others" category increased 
upto 3.74% in the third alternative. Although this increase can be considered to 
be too high, it may also be necessary in order to be able to achieve a 
progressive tax structure that taxes the high income groups at higher rates. At 
this point, it's important to be careful about the situation of the relatively low 
income earning tax payers who are also included within the same category with 
those who earn more or make a lot of profits due to exemptions.
Achieving a unitary income taxation system is important for both equity and 
efficiency. This is, probably, the only point where efficiency and tax equity 
aspects coincide. In a unitary system of taxation the exemptions and
^^ibid. p.6.
^ i^bid...
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immunities are either deleted as a whole or reduced to a very limited level. The 
distributed profits must also be included within the income taxation system. 
Income and corporate taxation must be combined within a single system and 
the final tax burden on the shareholders must be determined by income 
taxation. By such a reform the corporate tax rates can be pulled down to lower 
levels. As the difference between income and corporate tax rates increase, 
corporations can be promoted. Higher income tax rates will prevent 
entrepreneurs from over-distributing profits. Also the decrease in corporate tax 
rates will relatively increase the debt services. Therefore firms will prefer to 
rely on their own capital gains rather than outside debt^ **. Indeed firms can rely 
on resources other than their own resources and there is nothing to criticize 
about this. But a total substitution of debt for self resources cannot be 
approved^’. First, the interest services of debt are deduced from tax and this 
reduces the corporate tax revenue of government. Second the costs of debt 
services are reflected to consumer prices. Third, when the tax on interest 
earnings is also quite low, some people earn high levels of income through 
riskles and untaxed means.
In corporations the shareholders and the lenders must be subject to equal 
levels of tax burden. This will prevent the substitution of debt for self 
resources. In order to achieve this, methods to determine the owners of all the 
valuable papers must be applied. Also the distributed shares must be subject to 
income taxation.
Moreover, we must notice that income and corporate taxes are applicable to 
only income that is flowing. But the growth in the stock exchange market and 
social factors like rapid urbanization, population growth and inflation have 
caused accumulation of rent earnings within certain social layers. Income 
created through such gains, must be taxed by mechanisms other than income 
and corporate taxation that can only catch the flowing income. With the 
existing level of computer technology such mechanisms are quite easy to 
apply.
Another important field of reform is the income tax scheme. As we have 
observed the income tax scheme in Turkey has become less and less 
progressive through the years. In addition to this the overall tax system has 
become more regressive by the increased weight of the indirect taxes that are 
already regressive. At this point, we again face the trade-off between tax 
revenue and tax equity. If we increase the degree of progressivity of the tax 
scheme, tax revenue decreases. To observe this result, we can use the report by 
World Bank (1987). Table 3.12 shows the results for three different 
alternatives. The alternatives are built on the data of 1985. Here we can only 
make a static analysis by comparing the realized tax revenue. Of course this 
ignores how labor responds to changing tax rates. Also we cannot change the
38Turkan, E. (1993).
3i>6nder, i. (1993), p.58.
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tax brackets since the data about the tax base of different income groups are 
available only for the original brackets. Still in order to increase the number of 
brackets, we made an assumption. The tax base for the highest tax bracket in 
1985 is divided into two and three equal portions to increase the tax brackets 
for the second and third alternatives respectively.
In the first alternative, the tax rate for the first bracket is decreased down to 
20%. Then an increasing average rate scheme has been applied. The rate for 
the highest bracket is kept constant at 55% that is also equal to the highest rate 
in the scheme. This increased the tax progressivity for the first bracket only 
and delayed the shift to proportional tax scheme. The progressivity in the 
middle brackets are higher in the original scheme where the increases in 
average tax rates are higher. The new scheme has two advantages: On the one 
hand the tax burden on the lowest income group has declined and this 
increased tax equity for this group. On the other hand the average rate on the 
second and third highest brackets decreased and this can result in an increase in 
labor supply and declaration of income for these groups. But the trade off for 
this is a reduction in tax revenue by 16%. In the other two alternatives the 
numbers of tax brackets are increased to 8 and 9 respectively. This further 
delayed the shift to proportional taxes. Also the increased tax rates for the 
highest income bracket increased the tax revenue. Still at the third alternative 
with a 65% marginal tax rate at the top, there is a loss of 15% in tax revenue 
when compared with the original scheme in 1985. But we must note that the 
average tax burden for the higher income groups is also decreased in the 
alternative schemes when compared to the original.
An important fact about the distribution of income in Turkey must be 
underlined at this point. Since most of the population belongs to lower income 
groups the tax base for lower brackets is larger. Therefore decreasing the tax 
burden on the lower income groups result in important amount of losses in tax 
revenue. Still decreasing the tax rates on the lower brackets must be on the 
agenda. To limit the losses in tax revenue and to adjust to the stabilization 
program, the lowest rate may be pulled down to 20% in the medium run. In 
this first transitional alternative the number of brackets can be kept constant at 
six. This adjustment is simulated using the real tax brackets of 1993 on the 
basis of 1985. This first alternative is more progressive than the original 
scheme of 1993 for all income brackets. Table-3.13 shows the change in 
progressivity for three alternative schemes on the tax brackets of 1993.
In the second alternative, the lowest rate is reduced to 15% and the number 
of brackets is increased to 8 where the highest rate is 55%. The second 
alternative increases the progression in tax liability for all brackets. Also the 
tax system is less redistributive at the first five brackets and more redistributive 
at highest three brackets, when compared to the original scheme. In terms of 
progressivity and tax revenue requirements, a narrower first bracket with a low 
rate is a better alternative than a broader first bracket with a higher tax rate.
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The rearrangement in 1994 brings a broader first tax bracket that will reduce 
the vertical tax equity.
In the third alternative, the marginal tax rate scheme of 1963 is applied to 
the income brackets of 1993. The effects of the decreased average rates for the 
lower income group can be tolerated with higher rates at the higher brackets. 
The liability progression increases for all brackets the tax system becomes 
more redistributive beginning from the foiuth bracket. But this alternative 
includes high average rates like 63% and 60%. The incentive effects must be 
considered for such an alternative. But as we have seen in Table 3.2 the high 
income groups are not very sensitive to changes in average tax rates.
The suggestions to increase income tax progressivity cannot be considered 
without an effective reform about the exemption level in income taxation. The 
exemption level must be increased gradually so as to catch up with at least the 
minimum wage level. But within a reform package the real level of exemption 
must first increase upto the level in 1981 and it must be adjusted according to 
inflation rate each year. The level of exemption can be lower for the second 
and third brackets and the application of exemption can be withdrawn for the 
higher groups. This application not only increases progressivity but also can 
reduce the losses in tax revenue by two means: the total amount of exemptions 
will be lower and the level of declaration of income for low and middle 
income groups can be increased which will in turn increase the tax revenue.
The income tax brackets must also be adjusted according to inflation. In the 
existing system the brackets increase as multiples of the first bracket. 
Therefore the width of the higher level brackets increases more than that of the 
lower. It's also important to note that there are different inflation rates applying 
to different goods and usually the inflation rate on food, which covers bigger 
portions of the budget of lower income individuals, is higher than the average 
inflation rate. Therefore the adjustment in the lowest tax bracket can be higher 
than the inflation rate. In this case the first income bracket can be narrower. In 
any case, the need for a relation to determine different levels of inflation 
adjustments for different income groups is urgent, as we have already pointed 
at in Part 2.4. Such an application will increase the degree of progressivity, the 
benefits of the wage earners and the tax revenue. Also the automatic 
adjustment must be revised every five year.
Finally any tax reform in income taxation must include an effective 
mechanism of tax collection where the difference between effective rates and 
the legal rates is negligible.
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Table 3.1: Income Tax Structure (base year: 1985)
incom e bracket G’L)
(m illion TL) 
real bracket
m argina 
income 
tax rates
. .(%)
average 
income 
tax rates 
(%)
average
rate
progress.
liability
progress
residual
incom e
progress.
Year: 1963
0 -2,500 0.00 -0.25 10 10.00 - _
2,500 -5,000 0.25 -0.50 15 12.50 1.00 1.50 0.94
5,000 -10,000 0.50 -1.00 20 16.25 0.75 1.60 0.91
10,000 -25,000 1.00 -2.50 25 21.50 0.35 1.54 0,90
25,000 -55,000 2.50 -5.50 35 28.86 0,25 1.63 0.83
55,000 -115,000 5.50 -11,50 45 37.28 0.14 1.56 0,77
115,000 -265,000 11.50 -26.50 55 47.31 0.07 1.48 0,72
265,000 -490,000 26.50 -49.00 60 53.14 0.03 1.27 0.76
490,000 -715,000 49.00 -71.50 65 56.87 0.02 1.22 0.75
715,000 -1,000,000 71,50 -100.00 68 60.04 0.01 1.20 0.74
1,000,000 -2,000,000 100.00 -200.00 60 60.02 0.00 1.00 1.00
2,000,000 -4,000,000 200.00 -400.00 60 60.01 0.00 1.00 1.00
Year: 1980
0 -2,500 0.00 -0.01 10 10.00 - - _
2,500 -5,000 0.01 -0.03 15 12.50 1,98 1.50 0.94
5,000 -10,000 0,03 -0.05 20 16.25 1.49 1.60 0.91
10,000 -25,000 0.05 -0.13 25 21.50 0.69 1.54 0,90
25,000 -55,000 0.13 -0.28 35 28.86 0.49 1.63 0.83
55,000 -115,000 0.28 -0.58 45 37.28 0.28 1.56 0.77
115,000 -265,000 0,58 -1.34 55 47.31 0.13 1.48 0,72
265,000 -490,000 1.34 -2,47 60 53.14 0,05 1,27 0.76
490,000 -715,000 2.47 -3.61 65 56.87 0.03 1.22 0,75
715,000 -1,000,000 3,61 -5.05 68 60.04 0.02 1.20 0.74
1,000,000 -2,000,000 5.05 -10.10 60 60.02 0.00 1.00 1.00
2,000,000 -4,000,000 10.10 -20.20 60 60.01 0.00 1,00 1.00
Year: 1981
0 -1,000,000 0.00 -3.70 40 40.00 - - -
1,000,000 -3,000,000 3.70 -11.11 45 ^ 4 3 .3 3 0.45 1.13 ^  0.92
3,000,000 -5,000,000 11.11 -18.52 50 46.00 0.36 1.15 0.88
5,000,000 -10,000,000 18.52 -37.04 60 53.00 0.38 1.30 0.74
10,000,000 -15,000,000 37.04 -55.56 70 58.67 0.31 1.32 0.64
15,000,000 -25,000,000 55.56 -92.59 75 65,20 0.18 1.28 0.60
25,000,000 -50,000,000 92.59 -185.19 66 65.60 0.00 1.01 0.98
50,000,000 -100,000,000 185.19 -370.37 66 65.80 0.00 1.01 0.99
100,000,000 -200,000,000 370.37 -740.74 66 65.90 0.00 1.00 0.99
Year: 1982
0 -1,000,000 0.00 -2.82 39 39.00 - - -
1,000,000 -3,000,000 2.82 -8.47 44 42.33 0.59 1.13 0.92
3 ,000 ,000-5 ,000 ,000 8.47 -14,12 49 45.00 0.47 1.16 0.88
5,000,000 -10,000,000 14,12 -28.25 59 52.00 0.50 1.31 0.75
10,000,000 -15,000,000 28.25 -42.37 69 57.67 0.40 1.33 0.65
15,000,000 -25,000,000 42,37 -70.62 74 64.20 0.23 1.28 0.61
25,000,000 -50,000,000 70.62 -141.24 65 64.60 0.01 1.01 0.98
50,000,000 -100,000,000 141.24 -282.49 65 64.80 0.00 1.01 0.99
100,000,000 -200,000,000 282,49 -564.97 65 64,90 0,00 1.00 0.99
Table 3.1 continued...
incom e bracet (TL)
(m illion TL) 
real bracet
marginal 
income 
tax rates 
(%)
average 
income 
tax rates 
(%)
average
rate
progress.
liability
progress
residual
income
progress.
Year: 1983
0 -1,000,000 0.00 -2.15 36 36.00 - _ _
1,000,000 -3,000,000 2.15 -6.45 41 39.33 0.78 1.14 0.92
3,000,000 -5,000,000 6.45 -10.75 49 43.20 0.90 1.25 0.84
5,000,000 -10,000,000 10.75 -21.51 59 51.10 0.73 1.37 0.72
10,000,000 -15,000,000 21.51 -32.26 69 57.07 0.55 1.35 0.63
15,000,000 -25,000,000 32.26 -53.76 74 63.84 0.31 1.30 0.61
25,000,000 -50,000,000 53.76 -107.53 65 64.42 0.01 1.02 0.97
50,000,000 -100,000,000 107.53 -215.05 65 64.71 0.00 1.01 0.98
100,000,000 -200,000,000 215.05 -430.11 65 64.86 0.00 1.00 0.99
Year: 1984
0 -1,000,000 0.00 -1.45 30 30.00 - - -
1,000,000 -3,000,000 1.45 -4.35 35 33.33 1.15 1.17 0.93
3,000,000 -5,000,000 4.35 -7.25 43 37.20 1.33 1.29 0.86
5,000,000 -10,000,000 7.25 -14.49 53 45.10 1.09 1.42 0.75
10,000,000 -15,000,000 14.49 -21.74 63 51.07 0.82 1.40 0.67
15,000,000 -25,000,000 21.74 -36.23 68 57.84 0.47 1.33 0.65
25,000,000 -50,000,000 36.23 -72.46 60 58.92 0.03 1.04 0.95
50,000,000 -100,000,000 72.46 -144.93 60 59.46 0.01 1.02 0.97
100,000,000 -200,000,000 144.93 -289.86 60 59.73 0.00 1.01 0.99
Year: 1985
0 -1,000,000 0.00 -1.00 25 25.00 - - -
1,000,000 -3,000,000 1.00 -3.00 30 28.33 1.67 1.20 0.93
3,000,000 -5,000,000 3.00 -5.00 38 32.20 1.93 1.34 0.87
5,000,000 -10,000,000 5.00 -10.00 48 40.10 1.58 1.49 0.77
10,000,000 -15,000,000 10.00 -15.00 58 46.07 1.19 1.45 0.70
15,000,000 -25,000,000 15.00 -25.00 63 52.84 0.68 1.37 0.69
25,000,000 -50,000,000 25.00 -50.00 55 53.92 0.04 1.04 0.95
50,000,000 -100,000,000 50.00 -100.00 55 54.46 0.01 1.02 0.98
100,000,000 -200,000,000 100.00 -200.00 55 54.73 0.00 1.01 0.99
Year: 1986
0 -3,000,000 0.00 -2.23 25 25.00 - - -
3,000,000 -6,000,000 2.23 -4.46 30 27.50 1.12 1.20 0.93
6,000,000 -12,000,000 4.46 -8.92 35 31.25 0.84 1.27 0.90
12,000,000 -24,000,000 8.92 -17.83 40 35.63 0.49 1.28 0.87
24,000,000 -48,000,000 17.83 -35.66 45 40.31 0.26 1.26 0.85
48,000,000 -96,000,000 35.66 -71.32 50 45.16 0.14 1.24 0.84
96,000,000 -192,000,000 71.32 -142.64 50 47.58 0.03 1.11 0.91
192,000,000 -384,000,000 142.64 -285.29 50 48.79 0.01 1.05 0.95
384,000,000 -768,000,000 285.29 -570.58 50 49.39 0.00 1.02 0.98
Table 3.1 continued...
incom e bracet (TL)
(m illion TL) 
real bracet
marginal 
income 
tax rates
(%)
1 average 
incom e 
tax rates
.. (%)
average 
i rate 
progress.
liability
progress
residual
income
progress.
Year: 1987
0 -3,000,000 0.00 -1.61 25 25.00 - - _
3,000,000 -6,000,000 1.61 -3.21 30 27.50 1.56 1.20 0.93
6,000,000 -12,000,000 3.21 -6.42 35 31.25 1.17 1.27 0.90
12,000,000 -24,000,000 6.42 -12.84 40 35.63 0.68 1.28 0.87
24,000,000 -48,000,000 12.84 -25.68 45 40.31 0.37 1,26 0.85
48,000,000 -96,000,000 25.68 -51.36 50 45.16 0.19 1.24 0.84
96,000,000 -192,000,000 51.36 -102.73 50 47.58 0.05 1.11 0.91
192,000,000 -384,000,000 102.73 -205.46 50 48.79 0.01 1.05 0.95
384,000,000 -768,000,000 205.46 -410.91 50 49.39 0.00 1.02 0.98
Year: 1988
0 -5,000,000 0.00 -1.53 25 25.00 - - -
5,000,000 -10,000,000 1.53 -3.05 30 27.50 1.64 1.20 0.93
10,000,000 -20,000,000 3.05 -6.10 35 31.25 1.23 1.27 0.90
20,000,000 -40,000,000 6.10 -12.20 40 35.63 0.72 r  1.28 0.87
40,000,000 -80,000,000 12.20 -24.41 45 40.31 0.38 ^ 1 . 2 6 0.85
80,000,000 -160,000,000 24.41 -48.81 50 45.16 0.20 1.24 0.84
160,000,000 -320,000,000 48.81 -97.62 50 47.58 0.05 1.11 0.91
320,000,000 -640,000,000 97.62 -195.24 50 48.79 0.01 1.05 0.95
640,000,000 -1,280,000,000 195.24 -390.48 50 49.39 0.00 1.02 0.98
Year: 1989
0 -6,000,000 0.00 -1.12 25 25.00 - - -
6,000,000 -12,000,000 1.12 -2.24 30 27.50 2.23 1.20 0.93
12,000,000 -24,000,000 2.24 -4.48 35 31.25 1.67 1.27 0.90
24,000,000 -48,000,000 4.48 -8.97 40 35.63 0.98 1.28 0.87
48,000,000 -96,000,000 8.97 -17.94 45 40.31 0.52 1.26 0.85
96,000,000 -192,000,000 17.94 -35.87 50 45.16 0.27 1.24 0.84
192,000,000 -384,000,000 35.87 -71.75 50 47.58 0.07 1.11 0.91
384,000,000 -768,000,000 71.75 -143.50 50 48.79 0.02 1.05 0.95
768,000,000 -1,536,000,000 143.50 -287.00 50 49.39 0.00 1.02 0.98
Year: 1990
0 -8,000,000 0.00 -0.93 25 25.00 - - -
8,000,000 -16,000,000 0.93 -1.87 30 27.50 2.68 1.20 0.93
16,000,000 -32,000,000 1.87 -3.73 35 31.25 2.01 1.27 0.90
32,000,000 -64,000,000 3.73 -7.46 40 35.63 1.17 1.28 0.87
64,000,000 -128,000,000 7.46 -14.92 45 40.31 0.63 1.26 0.85
128,000,000 -256,000,000 14.92 -29.84 50 45.16 0.32 1.24 0.84
256,000,000 -512,000,000 29.84 -59.68 50 47.58 0.08 1.11 0.91
512,000,000 -1,024,000,000 59.68 -119.36 50 48.79 0.02 1.05 0.95
1,024,000,000 -2,048,000,000 119.36 -238.72 50 49.39 0.01 1.02 0.98
Table 3.1 continued.
incom e bracet (TL)
(m illion TL) 
real bracef
margina 
income 
fax rates
(%)
average 
income 
tax rates 
(%)
average
rate
progress.
liability
progress
residual
income
progress.
Year: 1991
0 -12.000.000 0.00 -0.84 25 25.00 - _ _
12,000,000 -24,000,000 0.84 -1.69 30 27.50 2,97 1.20 0,93
24,000,000 -48,000,000 1.69 -3.37 35 31.25 2.22 1.27 0.90
48,000,000 -96,000,000 3.37 -6.74 40 35.63 1.30 1.28 0.87
96,000,000 -192.000,000 6.74 -13.48 45 40.31 0.70 1.26 0.85
192,000,000 -384,000,000 13.48 -26.97 50 45.16 0.36 1,24 0.84
384,000,000 -768,000,000 26.97 -53.94 50 47.58 0.09 1.11 0.91
768,000,000 -1,536,000,000 53.94 -107.87 50 48.79 0.02 1.05 0.95
1,536,000,000 -3,072,000,000 107.87 -215.75 50 49.39 0.01 1,02 0.98
Year: 1992
0 -20,000,000 0.00 -0.83 25 25.00 - - -
20,000,000 -40,000,000 0.83 -1.65 30 27.50 3.03 1.20 0.93
40,000,000 -80,000,000 1.65 -3.30 35 31.25 2.27 1,27 0.90
60,000,000 -160,000,000 3.30 -6,61 40 35.63 1.32 1.28 0.87
160,000,000 -320,000,000 6.61 -13.21 45 40.31 0.71 1.26 0.85
320,000,000 -640,000,000 13.21 -26.43 50 45.16 0.37 1.24 0.84
640,000,000 -1,280,000,000 26.43 -52.86 50 47.58 0.09 1.11 0.91
1,280,000,000 -2,560,000,000 52,86 -105,71 50 48.79 0.02 1.05 0.95
2,560,000,000 -5,120,000,000 105.71 -211.42 50 49.39 0.01 1,02 0.98
Year: 1993
0 -32,000,000 0.00 -0.78 25 25.00 - - -
32,000,000 -64,000,000 0.78 -1.55 30 27.50 3.22 1.20 0.93
64,000,000 -128,000,000 1.55 -3.11 35 31.25 2.42 1.27 0.90
128,000,000 -256,000,000 3.11 -6.21 40 35.63 1.41 1,28 0.87
256,000,000 -512,000,000 6.21 -12.42 45 40.31 0.75 1.26 0.85
512,000,000 -1,024,000,000 12.42 -24.84 50 45.16 0.39 1.24 0.84
1,024,000,000 -2,048,000,000 24.84 -49.68 50 47.58 0.10 1.11 0.91
2,048,000,000 -4,096,000,000 49.68 -99.37 50 48.79 0.02 1,05 0.95
4,096,000,000 -8,192,000,000 99.37 -198.74 50 49.39 0.0 i 1.02 0,98
Source; Various Issues of Turkish Official New spaper
Tabio 3.2; Effective Tax Rates Due To Income Tax Brackets
year
Incom e 
Bracket 
(m illion TL)
Num ber
of
Taxpayers
Tax Base 
(m illion TL)
Revenue 
(million TL) 
(collectecj
average 
effective 
tax rate 
(%)
average 
legal tax 
rates (%)
Tax
Revenue 
(m illion TL) 
(realized)
1980 0 - 1 1376893 144373 56508 39.14 60.04 86682
1 8c m ore 74990 74990 37952 50.61 60.00 44994
Total Tax Revenue 94460 131676
1981 0 - 1 1136454 178616 65606 36.73 40.00 71446
1 - 3 39811 65887 24457 37.12 43.33 28551
3 - 5 6961 26482 9976 37.67 46.00 12182
5 - 1 0 4058 27735 11255 40.58 53.00 14700
1 0 -2 5 ~ 1 974 11707 5145 43.95 58.67 6868
1 5 - 2 5 549 10344 4987 48.21 65.20 6744
25 8c more 371 20340 9566 47.03 65.60 13343
Total Tax Revenue 130992 153834
1982 0 - 1 1080246 212838 78026 36.66 39.00 83007
1 - 3 24631 74296 29057 39.11 42.33 31452
3 - 5 3051 28980 11380 39.27 45.00 13041
5 -  iO 2192 34129 14484 42.44 52.00 17747
1 0 - 2 5 501 14634 6577 44.94 57.67 8439
1 5 - 2 5 381 14786 7182 48.57 64.20 9493
25 8c m ore 355 I 29398 14240 48.44 64.60 18991
Total Tax Revenue 160947 182170
1983 0 - 1 1047465 237296 78118 32.92 36.00 85427
1 - 3 6690^ 109351 35911 32.84 39.33 43011
3 - 5 12057 46200 15491 33.53 43.20 19958
5 - 1 0 7 7 ^ 53188 19818 37.26 51.10 27179
1 0 - 2 5 1921 23163 9460 40.84 57.07 13218
1 5 - 2 5 1163 22117 9997 45.20 63.84 14119
25 8c more 8 I 2 ' 47908 21357 44.58 64.42 30862
Total Tax Revenue 190151 233776
1984 0 - 1 1014684 286213 78308 27.36 30.00 85864
1 - 3 109175"^ 179461 49621 27.65 33.33 59820
3 - 5 21063' 80640 23708 29.40 37.20 29998
5 - 1 0 13390 91306 30487 33.39 45.10 41179
1 0 - 2 5 3341 40221 15228 37.86 51.07 20540
1 5 - 2 5 1945 36779 15627 42.49 57.84 21273
25 8c m ore 1289 84928 35593 41.91 58.92 50040
Total Tax Revenue 248572 308713
1985 0 - 1 981903 335130 78521 23.43 25.00 83783
1 - 3 151447 249571 63341 25.38 28.33 70712
3 - 5 30069 115080 31935 27.75 32.20 37056
5 - 1 0 18989 129424 41144 31.79 40.10 51899
1 0 - 2 5 4761 57279 20993 36.65 46.07 26387
1 5 - 2 5 2727 51441 21255 41.32 52.84 27181
25 8c m ore 1766 121948 49840 40.87 53.92 65754
Total Tax Revenue 307029 362771
1986 0 - 3 1045982 543888 117208 21.55 25.00 135972
3 - 6 135935 309361 78671 25.43 27.50 85074
6 - 1 2 24588 167542 51821 3 0 .9 3 ^ 31.25 52357
1 2 - 2 4 7936 107389 40206" 3 7 .4 4 ^ 35.63 38257
2 4 - 4 8 2876 112536 45476 40.41 40.31 45366
48 8c m ore 1755 33052 13442 40.67 45.16 14925
Total Tax Revenue 346824 371952
Source: W orld  Bonk (1987).
Table 3.3: Real Amount of Tax Paid at the Highest Tax Bracket (base year: 1985)
Year
Highest Tax 
Bracket 
(million TL)
Number of 
Tax Payers
Share in 
Total Tax 
Burden (%)
Average 
legal tax 
rates (%)
Nominal 
Tax Base 
(million TL)
Real Tax 
Base
(million TL)
Nominal 
Tax Paid 
(million TL)
Real Tax Paid 
(million TL)
elasticity of 
fax base 
due to tax 
rate
1980 1 & more 27003 1.92 60 74990 378737 37949 191662 _
1981 25 & more 371 0.03 66 20340 75333 9566 35430 -8.01
1982 25 & more 355 0.03 65 29398 83045 14240 40226 -6.76
1983 25 & more 812 0.07 65 47908 103028 21359 45933 _
1984 25 8c more 1289 0.11 60 84928 123084 35597 51590 -2,53
1985 25 8c more 1766 0.15 55 121948 121948 49835 49835 0.11
1986 48 8c more 1755 0.15 50 33052 24556 13443 9987 8.79
Figure 3.1:1963 Average & Marginal Income Tax Rates
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Figure 3.2; 1980 Marginal & Average Income Tax Rates
■  m arginal 
□  average
0.01 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.28 0.58 1.34 2.47
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Figure 3.3: 1981 Marginal & Average Income Tax Tates
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Figure 3.4: 1982 Marginal & Average Income Tax Rates
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Figure 3.5: 1983 Marginal & Average Income Tax Rates
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Figure 3.6; 1984 Marginal & Average Inconne Tax Rates
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□  average
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Figure 3,7:1985 Marginal & Average Income Tax Rates
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Figure 3.8: 1986 Marginal & Average Income Tax Rates
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Figure 3.9:1987 Marginal & Average IncomeTax Rates
1.61 3.21 6.42 12.84 25,68 61.36
income tax bracket (million TL)
102.73 205.46 410.91
Figure 3.10; 1988 Marginal & Average Income Tax Rates
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Figure 3.11:1989 Marginal & Average Income Tax Rates
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Figure 3.12:1990 Marginal & Average Income Tax Rates
0.93 1.87 3.73 7.46 14.92 29.84
income tax bracket (million TL)
59.68 119.36 238.72
Figure 3.13:1991 Marginal & Average Income Tax Rates
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income tax bracket (million TL)
53.94 107.87 216.75
Figure 3.14:1992 Marginal & Average Income Tax Rates
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Figure 3.15:1993 Marginal & Average Income Tax Rates
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Table 3.4: Point of Decline in Residual Income Progression
Year Real Income Level of Decline (million TL) Coefficient
1963 100 1
1980 5.05 1
1981 92.59 0.98
1982 70.62 0.98
1983 53.76 0.97
1984 36.23 0.95
1985 25 0.95
1986 71.32 0.91
1987 51.36 0.91
1988 48.81 0.91
1989 35.87 0.91
1990 29.84 0.91
1991 26.97 0.91
1992 26.43 0.91
1993 24.84 0.91
Figure 3.16; Average Income Tax Rates in 1963 &1981
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Table 3.5: Comparison of 1963 and 1981
(m illion TL)
Real Incom e Bracket
average tax rates(%) average rate prog. liability prog. residual prog.
1963 1981 1963 1981 1963 1981 1963 1980
0.00 -0.25 10.00 40,00 - - - - - -
0.25 -0.50 12.50 40.00 10.00 - 1.50 - 0.94 -
0.50 -1.00 16,25 40.00 7.50 - 1.60 - 0.91 -
1,00 -2.50 21.50 40,00 3.50 - 1.54 - 0.90 -
2.50 -3.70 28.86 ^ 40,00 2.50 - 1.63 - 0,83 -
3.70 -5.50 28.86 43.33 2.50 0.45 1.63 1,13 0.83 0.92
5.50 - n . n 37.28 43.33 1.40 0.45 1.56 1.13 0.77 0.92
11,11 -11.50 37.28 46.00 1.40 0.36 1.56 1.15 0.77 0.88
11,50 -18,52 47.31 46.00 0.70 0.36 1.48 1.15 0.72 0.88
18.52 -26.50 47.31 53.00 0.70 0.38 1.48 1.30 0.72 0.74
26.50 -37.04 53.14 53.00 0.30 0.38 1.27 1.30 0.76 0.74
37.04 -49.00 53.14 58.67 0.30 0.31 1.27 1.28 0.76 0.60
49.00 -55.56 56.87 58.67 0.20 0.31 1.22 1.28 0.75 0.60
55.56 -71.50 56.87 65.20 0.20 0.18 1,22 1.28 0.75 0.60
71.50 -92.59 60.04 65.20 0.10 0.18 1.20 1.28 0,74 0.60
92.59 -100.00 60.04 65.60 0.10 0.00 1.20 1.01 0.74 0.98
100.00 -185.19 60.02 65,60 0.00 0.00 1.00 1,01 1.00 0.98
185.19 -200.00 60.02 65.80 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.99
200.00 -370.37 60.01 65.80 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.99
370.37 -740.74 60.00 66.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1,00 0.99
Figure 3.17; Average Income Tax Rates In 1981 & 1985
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Table 3.6: Comparison of 1981 and 1985
(m illion TL) average tax rates(%) average irate prog. liability prog. residual prog.
Real Incom e Bracket 1981 1985 1981 1985 1981 1985 1981 1985
0.00 -1.00 40.00 25.00 - - - - - -
1.00 -3.00 40.00 28.33 - 1.67 1.20 - 0.93
3.00 -3.70 40.00 32.20 - 1.93 - 1.34 - 0.87
3.70 -5.00 43.33 32.20 0.45 1.93 1.13 1.34 0.92 0.87
5.00 -10.00 43.33 40.10 0.45 1.58 1.13 1.49 0.92 0.77
10.00 -11.11 43.33 46.07 0.45 1.19 1.13 1.45 0.92 0.70
11.11 -15.00 46.00 46.07 0.36 1.19 1.15 1.45 0.88 0.70
15.00 -18.52 46.00 52.84 0.36 0.68 1.15 1.37 0.88 1.04
18.52 -25.00 53.00 52.84 0.38 0.68 1.30 1.37 0.74 1.04
25.00 -37.04 53.00 53.92 0.38 0.04 1.30 1.04 0.74 0.95
37.04 -50.00 58.67 53.92 0.31 0.04 1.32 1.04 0.64 0.95
50.00 -55.56 58.67 54.46 0.31 0.01 1.32 1.02 0.64 0.98
55.56 -92.59 65.20 54.46 0.18 0.01 1.28 1.02 0.60 0.98
92.59 -100.00 6 5 .6 0 n 54.46 0.00 0.01 1.01 1.02 0.98 0.98
100.00 -185.19 65.60 55.00 0.00 0.00 1 1.01 1.01 0.98 0.99
185.19 -370.37 65.80 55.00 0.00 0.00 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.99
370.37 -740.74 66.00 55.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.01 0.99 0.99
Figure 3.18: Average Income Tax Rates in 1985 &1986
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Table 3.7 Comparison of 1985 and 1986
(m illion TL)
Real Incom e Bracket
average tax rates(%) average rate prog. liability prog. residual prog.
1985 1986 1985 1986 1985 1986 1985 1986
0.00 -1.00 25.00 25.00 - - - -
1.00 -2.23 28.33 25.00 1.67 - 1.20 - 0.93
2.23 -3.00 28.33 27.50 1.67 1.12 1.20 1.20 0.93 0.93
3.00 -4.4Ó 32.20 27.50 1.93 1.12 1.34 1.20 0.87 0.93
4.4Ó -6.00 32.20 31.25 1.93 0.84 1.34 1.27 0.87 0.90
5.00 -8.92 40.10 31.25 1.58 0.84 1.49 1.27 0.77 0.90
8.92 -10.00 40.10 35.63 1.58 0.49 1.49 1.28 0.77 0.87
10.00 -15.00 46.70 36.63 1.19 0.49 1.45 1.28 0.70 0.87
15.00 -17.83 52.84 35.63 0.68 0.49 1.37 1.28 0.69 0.87
17.83 -25.00 52.84 40.31 0.68 0.26 1.37 1.26 0.69 0.85
25.00 -35.66 53.92 40.31 0.04 0.26 1.04 1.26 0.95 0.85
35.66 -50.00 53.92 45.16 0.04 0.14 1.04 1.24 0.95 0.84
50.00 -71.32 1 64.46 45.16 0.01 0.14 1.02 1.24 0.98 0.84
71.32 -100.00 ^ 54.46 47.58 0.01 0.03 1.02 1.11 0.98 0.91
100.00 -142.64 54.73 47.58 0.00 0.03 1.01 1.11 0.99 0.91
142.64 -200.00 54.73 48.79 0.00 1 0.01 1.01 1.05 0.99 0.98
200.00 -285.29 55.00 48.79 0.00 0.01 1.00 1.05 1.00 0.98
285.29 -570.58 55.00 49.39 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
570.58 -1141.16 55.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Figure 3.19: Average Income Tax Rates In 1963 & 1993
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Table 3.8 : Comparison of 1963 and 1993
(m illion TL)
Real Incom e Bracket
QVGfOQ© tOX rOtGS(%) average rate prog. liability prog. residual prog.
1963 1993 1963 1993 1963 1993 1963 1993
0.00 -0.25 10.00 25.00 - - - - - -
0.25 -0.50 12.50 25.00 10.00 - 1.50 - 0.94 -
0.50 -0.78 16.25 25.00 7.50 - 1.60 - 0.91 -
0.78 -1.00 16.25 27.50 7.50 3.22 1.60 1.20 0.91 0.93
1.00 -1.55 21.50 27.50 3.50 3.22 1.54 1.20 0.90 0.93
1.55 -2.50 21.50 31.25 3.50 2.42 1.54 1.27 0.90 0.90
2.50 -3.11 28.86 31.25 2.50 2.42 1.63 1.27 0.83 0.90
3.11 -5.50 28.86 35.63 2.50 1.41 1.63 1.28 0.83 0.87
5.50 -6.21 37.28 35.63 1.40 1.41 1.56 1.28 0.77 0.87
6.21 -11.50 37.28 40.31 1.40 0.75 1.56 1.26 0.77 0.85
11.50 -12.42 47.31 40.31 0.70 0.75 1.48 1.26 0.72 0.85
12.42 -24.84 47.31 45.16 0.70 0.39 1.48 1.24 0.72 0.84
24.84 -26.50 47.31 47.58 0.70 0.10 1.48 1.11 0.72 0.91
26.50 -49.00 53.14 47.58 0.30 0.10 1.27 1.11 0.76 0.91
49.00 -71.50 56.87 48.79 0.20 0.02 1.22 1.05 0.75 0.95
71.50 -100.00 60.04 48.79 0.10 0.02 1.20 1.05 0.74 0.95
100.00 -200.00 60.00 50.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 1.02 1.00 0.98
Table 3.9: The Distribution of Effective Tax Burden over Factor Income Group
W age &
Years A gricultu re Sa la ry Rent Interest Others Total
Factor Incom e (b illion TL)
1987 12098.8 13183.8 3979.6 4053 32195.2 65510.4
1988 20262.7 23161.5 5258.5 9682.9 55281.9 113647.5
1989 35880.6 49805.8 7640.7 16756.7 89902.9 199986.7
1990 66006.8 98184.7 11409.1 24519 135648 335767.6
1991 88569.1 197477.9 20113.2 43371.5 179059 528590.7
1992 144662.1 339609.3 35509 83609.3 305795 909184.7
Tax Revenue ( billion TL)
1987 166 1265 73 155 3310 4969
1988 246 2463 153 239 4710 7811
1989 453 5781 548 746 7235 14763
1990 803 11748 1121 1254 11662 26588
1991 1340 21632 1596 1988 17995 44551
1992 2143 38016 2516 4295 32725 79695
Before Tax D istribution of Factor Incom e (%)
1987 18.47 20.12 6.07 6.19 49.15 100.00
1988 17.83 20.38 4.63 8.52 48.64 100.00
1989 17.94 24.90 3.82 8.38 44.95 100.00
1990 19.66 29.24 3.40 7.30 40.40 100.00
1991 16.76 37.36 3.81 8.21 33.87 100.00
1992 15.91 37.35 3.91 9.20 33.63 100.00
A verage 17.76 28.23 4.27 7.96 41.78 100.00
D istribution of ■fax Revenue (%)
1987 3.34 25.46 1.47 3.12 66.61 100.00
1988 3.15 31.53 1.96 3.06 60.30 100.00
1989 3.07 39.16 3.71 5.05 49.01 100.00
1990 3.02 44.19 4.22 4.72 43.86 100.00
1991 3.01 48.56 3.58 4.46 40.39 100.00
1992 2.69 47.70 3.16 5.39 41.06 100.00
A verage 3.05 39.43 3.02 4.30 50.21 100.00
1987 1.37 9.60 1.83 3.82 10.28 7.59
1988 1.21 10.63 2.91 2.47 8.52 6.87
1989 1.26 11.61 7.17 4.45 8.05 7.38
1990 1.22 11.97 9.83 5.11 8.60 7.92
1991 1.51 10.95 7.94 4.58 10.05 8.43
1992 1.48 11.19 7.09 5.14 10.70 8.77
A verage 1.34 10.99 6.13 4.26 9.37 7.83
Source:Ad il Tem el (1994).
Table 3.10: Redistrubutive Effects of Taxes on Income
W age &
Years A griculture Salary Rent Interest Others Total
A fte r Tax D istribution of Factor Incom e (%)
1987 19.71 19.69 6.45 6.44 47.71 100.00
1988 18.91 19.56 4.82 8,92 47,78 100.00
1989 19.13 23.77 3,83 8.64 44.63 100.00
1990 21.09 27.96 3.33 7.62 40.10 100.00
1991 18.02 36.33 3.83 8.55 33.27 100.00
1992 17.18 36.36 3,98 9,56 32.92 100,00
Average 19.01 27.28 4.37 8.27 41.07 100.00
Distribution of G ains & Losses Due to Incom e Taxation (%)
1987 6.72 -2.18 6.22 4.07 -2.92 0.00
1988 6.08 -4.04 4,26 4.73 -1.77 0.00
1989 6.61 -4.56 0.23 3.16 -0.72 0.00
1990 7.28 -4.39 -2.07 3.05 -0.74 0.00
1991 7.55 -2.76 0.54 4.20 -1.77 0.00
1992 7.98 -2.66 1,84 3.98 -2.12 0.00
A verage 7.02 -3.37 2,36 3.88 -1.69 0.00
Table 3.11: Results of Increasing the Effective Tax Burden
Years A griculture
W age & 
Sa lary Rent Interest Others Total
Factor Incom e (billion TL)
1992 144662,1 339609.3 35509 83609.3 305795 909184.7
Before Tax D istribution o f Factor Incom e
1992 15.91 37.35 3.91 9.20 33.63 100.00
Ettec live  Tax Burden (%)
average of 
1991-1992 1.50 11.07 7.51 4.86 10.38 8.60
A lternative 1 1.50 11.07 8.51 5.86 11.38 9.07
A lternative 2 1.50 11.07 9.51 6.86 12.38 9.54
A lternative 3 1.50 11.07 10.51 7.86 13.38 10.01
Tax Revenue ( billion TL)
1992 2143 38016 2516 4295 32725 79695
A lternative 1 2165.83 37608.63 3021.82 4899.50 34799,47 82463.05
A lternative 2 2 1 6 5 .8 3 ^ 37608.63 3376.91 5735.60 37857.42 86736.22
A lternative 3 2165.83 37608.63 3732.00 6571.69 40915.37 91009.39
D istribution o f 'tax Revenue (%)
1992 2.69 47.70 3.16 5.39 41.06 100.00
A lternative 1 2.63 45.61 3.66 5.94 42.20 100.00
A lternative 2 2.50 43.36 3.89 6.61 43.65 100.00
A lte rnative  3 2.38 41.32 4.10 7.22 44.96 100.00
A fter Tax D istribution o f Incom e (%)
1992 17.18 36.36 3.98 9.56 32.92 100.00
A lternative 1 17.24 36.53 3.93 9.52 32.78 100.00
A lternative 2 17.33 .) 36.72 3.91 9.47 32.58 100.00
A lternative 3 17.42 36.91 3.88 9.42 32.37 100.00
D istribution o f G ains & Losses Due to Incom e Taxation (%)
1992 7.98 -2.66 1.84 3.98 -2.12 0.00
A lte rnative  1 8.33 -2.20 0.62 3.53 -2.54 0.00
A lternative 2 8.89 -1.70 0.03 2.96 -3.14 0.00
A lternative 3 9.46 -1.18 -0.56 2.39 -3.74 0.00
Table 3.12: Effect of The Tax Scheme on Tax Revenue & Progressivity
Real 
Bracket 
(m illion TL)
Tax Base 
(m illion TL)
m arginal 
incom e 
tax rates 
(%)
average 
Income 
tax rates 
_(%)
Realized
Tax
Revenue 
(m illion TL)
average
rate
progress.
liability
progress.
residual
incom e
progress.
O rig ina l 1985
0 - 1 335130 25 25.00 83783 - - -
1 - 3 249571 30 28.33 70712 1.67 1.20 0.93
3 - 5 115080 38 32.20 37056 1.93 1.34 0.87
5 - 1 0 129424 48 40.10 51899 1.58 1.49 0.77
1 0 - 15 57279 58 46.07 26387 1.19 1.45 0.70
1 5 - 2 5 51441 63 52.84 27181 0.68 1.37 0.69
25 & m ore 121948 55 53.92 65754 0.04 1.04 0.95
Total tax revenue 362771
A lternative 1
0 - 1 335130 20 20.00 67026 - - -
1 - 3 249571 26 24.00 59897 2.00 1.30 0.93
3 - 5 115080 32 27.20 31302 1.60 1.33 0.89
5 -  10 129424" 38 32.60 42192 1.08 1.40 0.85
1 0 - 15 57279 45 36.73 21040 0.83 1.38 0.82
1 5 - 2 5 51441 50 42.04 21626 0.53 1.36 0.79
25 & m ore 12194"8 55 48.52 61347 0.26 1.31 0.78
Total tax revenue 304430
A lternative 2
0 -  1 335130 20 20.00 67026 - - -
1 - 3 249571 26 24.00 59897 2.00 1.30 0.93
3 - 5 115080 32 27.20 31302 1.60 1.33 0.89
5 - 1 0 129424 38 32.60 42192 1.08 1.40 0.85
1 0 - 1 5 57279 45 36.73 21040 0.83 1.38 0.82
1 5 - 2 5 51441 50 42.04 21626 0.53 1.36 0.79
2 5 - 5 0 60974 55 48.52 29585 0.26 1.31 0.78
50 & m ore 60974 60 54.26 33084 0.11 1.24 0.78
Total tax revenue 305752
A lternative 3
0 - 1 335130 20 20.00 67026 - - -
1 - 3 249571 26 24.00 59897 2.00 1.30 0.93
3 - 5 115080 32 27.20 31302 1.60 1.33 0.89
5 - 1 0 129424 38 32.60 42192 1 .0 8 H 1.40 0.85
1 0 - 1 5 57279 45 36.73 21040 0.83 1.38 0.82
1 5 - 2 5 51441 50 42.04 21626 0.53 1.36 0.79
2 5 - 5 0 40650 55 48.52 19723 0.26 1.31 ^ 0.78
5 0 - 1 0 0 40650 60 54.26 22057 0.11 1.24 0.78
100 &  m ore 40650 65 59.63 24240 0.05 1.20 0.77
Total tax revenue 309103
liable 3.13: Suggestions to Increase Progression (the brackets of 1993 are used.)
incom e bracet (TL)
(m illion TL) 
real bracet
marginal 
income 
tax rates 
(%)
average 
income 
tax rates
..... (%)
average
rate
progress.
liability
progress
residual
income
progress.
A lternative 1 (v/ith 6 brackets)
0 -32,000,000 0.00 -0.78 20 20.00 - - -
32,000,000 -64,000,000 0.78 -1.55 26 23.00 3.86 1.30 0,93
64,000,000 -128,000,000 1.55 -3.11 32 27.50 2.90 1.39 0.88
128,000,000 -256,000,000 3.11 -6.21 38 32.75 1.69 1.38 0.86
256,000,000 -512,000,000 6.21 -12.42 45 38.88 0.99 1.37 0.82
512,000,000 -1,024,000,000 12.42 -24.84 50 44.44 0.45 1.29 0.82
1,024,000,000 -2,048,000,000 24.84 -49.68 50 47.22 0.11 1.13 0,90
2,048,000,000 -4,096,000,000 49.68 -99.37 50 48.61 0.03 1.06 0.95
4,096,000,000 -8,192,000,000 99.37 -198.74 50 49.30 0.01 1.03 0.97
A lternative 2 (w ith 8 brackets)
0 -32,000,000 0.00 -0,78 15 15.00 - - -
32,000,000 -64,000,000 0.78 -1.55 20 17.50 3.22 1.33 0.94
64,000,000 -128,000,000 1.55 -3.11 26 21.75 2.74 1.49 0.90
128,000,000 -256,000,000 3.11 -6.21 32 26.88 1.65 1.47 0.87
256,000,000 -512,000,000 6.21 -12.42 38 32.44 0.90 1.41 0.85
512,000,000 -1,024,000,000 12.42 -24.84 45 38.72 0.51 1.39 0.81
1,024,000,000 -2,048,000,000 24.84 -49.68 50 44.36 0.23 1.29 0.82
2,048,000,000 -4,096,000,000 49.68 -99.37 55 49.68 0.11 1.24 0.81
4,096,000,000 -8,192,000,000 99.37 -198,74 55 52.34 0.03 1.11 0.89
8,192,000,000 -16,384,000,000 198.74 -397.48 55 53.67 0.01 1.05 0.94
16,384,000,000 -32,768,000,000 397.48 -794.95 55 54.33 0.00 1.02 0.97
A lternative 3 (w ith 11 brackets)
0 -32,000,000 0.00 -0.78 10 10.00 - - -
32,000,000 -64,000,000 0.78 -1.55 15 12.50 3.22 1.50 0.94
64,000,000 -128,000,000 1.55 -3.11 20 16.25 2.42 1.60 0.91
128,000,000 -256,000,000 3.11 -6.21 25 20.63 1.41 1.54 0.90
256,000,000 -512,000,000 6.21 -12.42 35 27,81 1.16 1.70 0.82
512,000,000 -1,024,000,000 12.42 -24.84 45 36.41 0.69 1.62 0.76
1,024,000,000 -2,048,000,000 24.84 -49.68 55 45.70 0.37 1.51 0.71
2,048,000,000 -4,096,000,000 49.68 -99.37 60 52.85 0.14 1.31 0.74
4,096,000,000 -8,192,000,000 99.37 -198.74 65 58.93 0.06 1.23 0.74
8,192,000,000 -16,384,000,000 198.74 -397.48 68 63.46 0.02 1.15 0.78
16,384,000,000 -32,768,000,000 397.48 -794.95 60 61.73 0.00 0,95 1.09
32,768,000,000 -65,536,000,000 794.95 -1589.9 60 60.87 0,00 0.97 1.05
4 Value-Added Taxation and Regressivity
4.1 Introduction
Value-added tax is considered to be the most efficient tax among all the 
indirect taxes. In Turkey, the adoption of VAT began in 1985. The successes 
of VAT implementation in terms of raising revenue, efficiency and 
effectiveness are obvious. But these successes must not prevent us from 
discussing the distributional effects of VAT. Such an analysis will make the 
conflict between efficiency and equity in a tax system clearer. Especially, since 
31.2% of total tax revenues consist of VAT, where the total share of all the 
indirect taxes is 52%·^ °, VAT deserves a more detailed analysis in observing 
the elements of progressivity and regressivity in Turkish tax structure.
4.2 Discussions about the Regressivity of VAT
Nearly sixty countries have chosen one or another form of VAT since it was 
first adopted in its comprehensive form in Brazil in 1967. In 70's it was made a 
condition for entry into the EEC by the original members of the community.
From the very first adoptions on, VAT is critisized persistently for being 
unfair to lower income groups. This criticism can basically be summarized in a 
syllogism:
1. Consumption taxes are regressive,
2. A VAT is a consumption tax,
S.Therefore a VAT is regressive.
This finding was summarized by Alain Tait in his book: "the general view is 
that VAT is a broad-based tax levied on essentials and as such must be 
regressive.
A study made by OECD finds "that consumption taxes and especially VAT 
are... somewhat regressive when related to income."·*- A principal finding of an 
analysis prepared for the Coalition Against Regressive Taxation in USA is that 
"excise taxes are the most regressive component of the federal tax system."·*  ^
The Treasury Department's 1984 Report to the President also concluded that a 
broad-based VAT was regressive·*·*. Finally, a statement, "In Support of a 
Value Added Tax", drafted by the American Council for Capital Formation 
explicitly acknowledges the regressivity of a VAT: "We are confident... that
•*®Ministry of Finance and Customs- Maliye ve Gümrük Bakanlığı (1993), p.68. 
‘*'Tait, A. (1988), p.214.
•*20ECD (1988), p.l23.
•*^  Carlson G. and M. Patrick (1989).
•*-*İbid...
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acceptable ways can be found to reduce its regressivity and to offset much or 
all of the burden on the poor."**^
At this point we arrive at another important discussion-how to overcome the 
regressivity of VAT?- which we wilt consider in this Part. Before we proceed 
into the solution proposals, it is necessary to have a deeper insight in terms of 
the reasons for regressivity.
The notion that a tax on consumption is regressive is based on consumer 
expenditure analysis and surveys showing that the percentage of income spent 
on consumption declines as income rises. As a result poor people give more of 
their income as VAT than rich people do. Both in the financial press and in 
economic journals a VAT is typically viewed as a tax that is borne in relation 
to consumption spending, and therefore is a consumption tax. This 
characterization applies to a consumption-style VAT where capital goods are 
free of tax by either allowing a credit for any tax paid on pmchases of capital 
equipment or by allowing the purchase price to be deducted directly from sales 
in determining the tax base. For this reason a VAT is regressive because it is 
virtually identical to a retail sales tax.
Apart from the empirical reality about the regressivity of a VAT, perhaps 
even more importantly, the political reality is that a VAT is perceived as 
regressive. As evidence of this reality, virtually all value added taxes, both 
enacted and proposed, have special rules to alter the distributional burden and 
thus alleviate regressivity. The value added taxes levied by the member 
countries of the EEC, for example rely on reduced or zero rates on 
"necessities" such as food and medicine.
4.3 Confronting the Regressivity of VAT
The problem of regressivity of VAT can be confronted in two different ways, 
from within the structure of the VAT itself, or by modifications in the fiscal 
and public finance structure. Solutions within the structure of VAT include 
basically differential rates, exemptions and refundable credits. Modifications in 
the fiscal structure can consist of replacing existing sales and excise taxes by 
VAT, raising revenue and shifting to progressive expenditure programs, 
restnicturing the tax system.
4.3.1 Solutions within the Structure of VAT
By working with the problem from within the structure of VAT, regressivity 
can be alleviated by taxing "necessities" at lower or zero rates and taxing 
"luxuries" at increased rates. Ideally, "necessities" would be goods and services 
consumed primarily by lower income groups, "luxuries" by those in the middle 
or upper income ranges. Because this approach is direct and understandable, it
ibid...
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has substantial political appeal. In the USA, for example, 27 states exempt 
food from retail sales tax·*^ . Similarly, European countries impose lower rates 
on food or other necessities or exempt them completely and tax purchases of 
automobiles, furs, cameras and electronic goods at higher rates.
In the EEC exemptions apply to services in the fields of health care, 
education, housing, social and cultural activities, finance and banking, and 
broadcasting. In Ireland and UK many essential goods are taxed at a zero rate. 
Until recently the number of reduced and increased rates in various member 
states was considerably greater, but in early '80’s most countries have restricted 
the application of differentiated rates in order to reduce administrative 
burdens·’’.
However, EEC while focusing on harmonization, still puts niles to apply 
reduced or overvalued rates to certain deliveries of goods and services. The 
result is a wide variation in level and range of rates among EEC countries.
The majority of the developing countries have resorted to a single or at best 
two rates. There is a large variation in levels among the developing countries 
also. But, the variation is somewhat narrower. For most of them, the standard 
rate ranges from 7% to 15%·’**.
Among Latin American countries, exemptions are limited essentially to 
basic foodstuff. Most of them apply VAT only to a few services. Brazil does 
not tax services at all, but food is not exempted.
Among Asian countries, some of the common exempts in ROC and Korea 
are medical, educational, financial and personal services. Indonesia exempts 
agriculture, livestock, drilling operations, delivery of low cost houses 
guaranteed by government, wrapping and packing products, serving food and 
drinks. Philippines zero rates its exports and foreign currency dominated sales 
and services·’^ .
The experience of Turkey will be reviewed as a whole in the next part.
The results of the optimal taxation literature are quite different. In the 
optimal taxation model with identical individuals, the typical rule, Ramsey's 
tax rule, says that the consumption tax rate on a commodity is inversely related 
to price elasticity of the commodity^^. Thus the tax rate on commodities with a 
steeper compensated demand curve is higher. An alternative formulation of 
this rule is that, the tax rates are inversely proportional to the income elasticity 
of demand. This is the typical contradiction between efficiency and fairness in 
optimal taxation literature. According to the optimal rule the tax on necessity 
goods is higher than tax on luxury goods. Another rule for optimal commodity
■” Cnossen, S. (1982), p.206.
‘‘«Chisti, Mahmud and Zaim (1992), pp.77-78.
‘’^ibid...
^“For a general introduction to literature, see Sandmo, A. (1976).
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taxation includes labor-leisure decisions^'. Thus, the tax on the good that is 
more complementary to leisure is higher. The purpose here is to increase the 
labor supply. These results also give a differentiated tax rate structure 
depending on certain elasticities, thus the uniform taxes are not necessarily 
optimal and optimality is directly related with increasing regressivity. Here it is 
important to note that most people support VAT because it is uniform and 
efficient.
The real life applications of differentiated rates are just the opposite of this 
classical optimal taxation model with identical individuals. However if we 
drop the assumption of identical individuals and shift to a social welfare model 
with differentiated individuals, the resulting rule will be sensitive to 
distributional considerations and the trade off between efficiency and 
fairness^-. According to this model if the social and individual marginal 
utilities of income are higher for the poor than it is for the rich, then the 
commodity that is consumed more by the poor should be subsidized and vice 
versa. Moreover if the consumption of a commodity that is consumed mostly 
by the rich is more than a commodity of the same kind, then the tax on the 
former is higher than the latter. This is similar to the real life applications to 
some extent.
However, there are a number of well-documented problems with the use of 
differential rates. The central technical lesson of European experience is that 
multiple rates can be used to reduce the regressivity of the value added tax, but 
penalties in administrative complexity, increased compliance costs and 
distortions in consumption decisions have been high and probably 
unjustified^^.
Differential rates are inefficient, administratively complex and limited in 
their capacity to realize the objective of reduced regressivity. Because they 
distort relative prices multiple rates encourage people to buy less of heavily 
taxed goods and more of lightly taxed goods. The result may be significant tax- 
induced changes in consumer purchasing patterns with accompanying revenue 
loss to the government.
Differentiated rates also force tax administrators to grapple with the 
problem of defining taxable and exempt commodities. The empirical problems 
are for sure more complicated than the theoretical models in terms of the data 
requirements. Even in the case of food, borderline issues inevitably arise as to 
whether items like candy, soft drinks or bottled water should qualify as exempt 
purchases or not. Finally it is difficult to identify goods and services for special 
taxation that only lower income individuals and families purchase. Lower and 
moderate income groups, for example, do not purchase only items that may be 
treated as necessities for tax purposes, such as food and housing; they purchase
^iCorlett, W.J. and D.C. Hague (1954). 
“ Diamond, P.A. (1975).
^^Cnossen (1982)...
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taxable goods and services, as well. Moreover, middle and upper income 
groups also purchase "necessities". Thus by exempting necessities the taxes 
paid by middle and upper income groups are reduced, while lower income 
groups still pay tax on their purchases of other, taxable commodities. In 
analyzing multi-rate systems, the OECD study concludes, "it has been 
suggested that in recent years the consumption patterns of different income 
groups have converged and if this is so applying multi-rates would be less 
important for increasing progressivity."^·  ^ According to this result the cost of 
multi-rates will be foregone tax revenue and there will be no gain. However, 
this may be a valid argument for a developed country, but it is quite doubtful 
that it holds for a developing country.
Another alternative for directly confronting the regressivity of a VAT is to 
reimburse tax payers for the tax paid on a minimal or essential level of 
consumption. The concept is that a single-rate tax would be imposed on a 
broadly defined base and eligible individuals and families would then receive 
reimbursement for the tax paid on some threshold level of consumption 
deemed to represent a minimal standard of living. Though, this alternative is 
not optimal, it is easier to handle and can deal with the problem of fairness as 
good as Diamond's model that we have explained above, if the mechanism of 
reimbursement is designed properly. Moreover the amount of tax revenue will 
not differ in this case.
There are typically two methods of providing such a credit. Either a flat 
credit (that is unavailable to tax payers having income above a given level) is 
offered to tax payers included in an eligible group or a graduated credit system 
that declines over an income range and ultimately vanishes, is made available. 
Some states limit eligibility of the credit to subgroups of the population; often, 
eligibility is limited to the elderly and the disabled earning under a specified 
income threshold.
The primary attraction of the reimbursement approach is that it avoids the 
problems that plague the multiple rate alternative. A reimbursement, for 
example is less costly in terms of revenue foregone because it targets the relief 
to the appropriate persons; more effective in alleviating regressivity, and 
avoids the inefficiency and administrative complexity associated with multiple 
rates.
However, the reimbursement alternative is not problem free. Eligible 
individuals and families must be identified and vehicle for delivering the 
reimbiu-sement must be established. While reimbursement mechanism 
contributes to vertical equity, there may be problems of horizontal equity.
Carlson, Speyrer and Brashares, in their analysis about "Distributional 
Aspects of a Federal VAT", have found out that the tax burden on the lower 
income groups can be reduced most effectively by a reimbursement 
mechanism for the poor, rather than by relying solely on automatic transfer
5-»OECD(1988), p.l23.
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payment adjustments or on exempting "necessities".“  They further note that 
this will not cause a loss of tax revenue when compared to a radical structure 
with quite many exemptions. Thus the burden of a VAT on lower income 
groups can be reduced dramatically without imposing unnecessary efficiency 
or compliance costs or requiring unreasonably high tax rates to raise the 
desired level of revenue.
4.3.2 Role of a VAT in Fiscal Structure
The distributional effects of a VAT need not be assessed in isolation from the 
other components of the fiscal structure. The general structure of taxation 
system and public expenditure policies are important components to consider 
at this point. Even if a VAT is regressive alone, the more relevant inquiry is 
with respect to the distributional consequences of general tax structure and 
public finance policy. In designing a VAT, there are at least four structural 
possibilities to consider:
1. Replace existing sales and excise taxes:
VAT could be used to reform and replace other indirect taxes. VAT 
played this role in most Western European countries, being used to replace 
clearly inferior cascade turnover taxes. Similarly Canada's VAT replaced the 
country's problem-ridden manufacturer's sales tax^ .^
2. Raise revenue and apply progressive expenditure programs:
A second possibility would be to use VAT for the purpose of rising 
revenue to reduce the budget deficit and to finance progressive expenditure 
programs. The regressivity of VAT can be confronted by spending VAT 
revenues for "progressive" piuposes, such as public education, health care, 
infrastructure, etc.
Within this framework VAT revenues might be used to finance long term 
health care, such as nursing or home care of the elderly. The response to the 
regressivity criticism would be that the revenues from the tax are being used to 
finance programs that meet social needs.
Traditionally, the debate has been over how tax burdens are distributed 
with respect to income groups. Using the tax revenues to fund social security 
programs would raise a new set of issues. For example if the revenues are used 
to fund the health care programs, in particular, the beneficiaries of such a 
program would tend to be in poor health, elderly, and perhaps live in urban 
areas where health care costs tend to be highest. Thus, the debate would shift 
from the tax burden by income groups to a debate over intergenerational and 
health status issues.
^^Carlson, Speyrer and Brashares (1988), ppl55-174. 
“ Carlson, G. and M. Patrick (1989), p.347.
36
3. Restructuring the tax system:
Recognizing that an income tax can be viewed as an impediment to 
capital formation because of its double taxation of savings, capital formation 
advocates assert that substituting VAT for a proportion of the income tax 
would enhance growth and investment. But this again brings efficiency aspect 
against fairness aspect of a tax structure.
For purposes of assessing the distributional consequences of VAT, other 
taxes in the public finance structure can be modified. Even if VAT is 
regressive, the concerns of policy makers should be an acceptable 
distributional burden for the entire tax system, not for any single tax within the 
tax system. If the distributional burden of VAT isn’t acceptable, then that 
burden could be modified by adjusting income and wealth taxes.
4. Anti-inflationary policies:
An indirect additional tax may lead to a wage-rise spiral. If VAT 
replaces other taxes on commodities and services, this may have an effect on 
relative prices, rather than on inflation on the average. But in the adjustment of 
relative prices, there may be some tendency for downward rigidity that leads to 
some increase in overall prices.
To confront possible inflationary tendency, the countries, at the 
beginning of their adoption of VAT, took some price control measures. For 
example, in ROC and Korea direct price controls were introduced on the 
wholesale and retail prices of selected commodities. In Korea the government 
has put specific controls over the prices charged by monopolies and oligopolies 
and put ceilings of factory and wholesale prices for 251 goods. Similarly ROC 
has adopted fiscal and monetary policy such as reduction in money supply, 
decrease in the tariffs, reduction in the price of electricity and petroleum 
products ·^ .^
4.4 VAT System in Turkey
Exemptions, the rate stmcture and reimbursement mechanism are the three 
basic properties that should be observed within the VAT system to analyze the 
distribution of tax burden over income groups.
In general exemptions in the application of VAT are used to reduce the 
regressivity of the tax and to promote exports. Goods and services supplied by 
the national and local public institutions, universities, political parties, trade 
unions, non-profit organizations, agricultural cooperative societies, social 
security institutions, etc. are exempt from VAT. Some cultural and health 
services supplied by public institutions are included within these exemptions. 
Leasing of immovable properties are exempt from the tax, except for the 
immovable properties included in the business assets of an enterprise.
^^Chisti, Mahmud and Zaim (1992), pp.8l-82.
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In Turkey, VAT has been used as a short term stabilization instrument for 
aggregate demand or budget deficit policies. As a result the rate structure has 
changed six times from 1985 to 1994. Since it has a broad tax base, it is 
considered to be an effective tool to achieve short term macroeconomic 
objectives. However, even when we leave the distributional considerations 
apart, still an unstable and unpredictable fiscal instrument that covers 30% of 
the tax revenue, has significant efficiency costs to the tax payers and also to the 
long term macroeconomic policies.
In 1985 Turkey started with a single standard rate of 10% while basic 
foodstuff and some agricultural inputs were zero rated. The rate on basic 
foodstuff increased to 3% in 1988, to 5% in October 1990, 6% in December 
1990 and finally to 8% in November 1993. Standard rate has also changed six 
times and it increased to 15% by the latest arrangements in the law.
The rate for some agricultural inputs was reduced to 1% in 1986. Also some 
other law rates are applied to books, newspapers, periodicals, health services 
(from December 1986 to October 1990), financial leasing services and natural 
gas services. For luxurious goods and services the rate has increased upto 23% 
by November 1993. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the changes in the rate 
structure, which are relevant for our discussion, between 1985 and May 1994.
The different rates applying to different goods arranged in detailed lists 
create a highly complex and confusing structure. The need for a simplified rate 
structure is obvious for administrative purposes.
The reason for a multi-rate system was basically to reduce the regressivity 
of VAT. However, as time passes the rates for most of the goods, including 
basic foodstuff, health care, the rates increased in order to raise higher amounts 
of revenue. Thus, in time distributional considerations have been replaced by 
tax revenue objectives. However, we must get a concrete picture of the 
distribution of tax burden in order to see how the changes in the rate structure 
effected the already existing regressivity of VAT.
For the analysis of tax burden due to income groups, we will utilize the 
1987 Household Income and Consumption Expenditures Survey^“, which 
reports the consumption pattern for 20 different monthly disposable income 
groups. The general proposition that low income individuals spend more of 
their income in consumption relative to high income families is valid also for 
Turkey. The lowest income group consumes 246% of its income. This 
proportion ranges from 128% to 50% for the next 17 groups whereas the 
proportion is as low as 15% for the 2 highest income groups. In this aspect 
VAT is a highly regressive tax. If a uniform rate of 10% is applied, the average 
tax rate would range from 24.6% to 1.7%.
In order to find out how the average value added tax rates and the degree of 
regressivity changed for 20 income groups in the 6 different tax periods from 
1985 to 1994, we assumed that the consumption expenditure pattern for 1987
5**State Institute of Statistics-Devlet Istatistik Enstitûsü (1987), pp.54-55.
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is valid for the whole period in concern. The reason for such an assumption is 
that SIS does not provide different surveys for different years. The validity of 
this assumption depends on the stability of the consumption pattern.
In the survey, the expenditure is grouped between 11 items: food; health; 
housing; house furnishings; personal care; restaurants and similar places; 
clothing; goods and services for household operation; transportation and 
communication; culture, education and entertainment; and others. We applied 
the rate on basic foodstuff to expenditures in food. The rate on expenditures on 
health is already determined by the law for all periods. The expenditure in 
housing is assumed to be exempted, since this item basically includes 
expenditure in rent and the leasing of nonfinancial immovable property is 
exempted from VAT. We apply the standard rate to expenditures in restaurants 
and similar places; clothing; goods and services for household operation; 
transportation and communication; culture, education and entertainment; and 
others. Table 4.2 shows the percentage of monthly disposable income spent on 
food, health, housing, luxurious and standard goods. Since the items are not 
defined in detail, we have to make some assumptions that sometimes cannot 
differentiate between luxurious or lower rate goods or even exemptions. For 
example the expenditure on culture, education and entertainment may well 
include standard, luxurious, exempted or low- rate goods and services. 
However, our analysis may still give a quite explanatory picture of the relative 
change in average tax rates and the degree of regressivity for different income 
groups.
Table 4.3 shows the amount of VAT as a percentage of monthly disposable 
income and Figure 4.1 is the graphical representation of the table.
In all periods the average tax rate is decreasing as we move up the income 
scale for the first 8 income groups. For the next 10 income groups, the average 
tax rate curve does not have a constant path. It shows progression for some 
levels and it becomes regressive again for some others. However the average 
rate curve is quite smooth for these middle groups, especially in the first six 
periods. Thus, VAT has been an approximately proportional tax for the income 
groups between level 8 and 18. The rate structure is again falling for the two 
highest groups. Though a tax stnicture with a uniform VAT rate of 10% would 
be much more regressive with average tax rates of 24.6% and 1.7% for the 
highest and lowest levels respectively, still with the least regressive period, 
which is the first period, the highest and lowest rates are 7.6% and 1.5% 
respectively. Moreover, if we compare the average tax rates at the top and 
bottom, the tax structure in the sixth period is almost as regressive as the 
uniform rate structure with a rate of 10%.
The figure shows another very important conclusion: The increases in the 
tax rate on basic foodstuff, health services and the standard rate have effected 
mostly the low income groups, whereas the high income groups are not 
effected much by the changes.
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Each period the VAT stmcture has become more and more regressive, thus 
the average VAT burden curve has become steeper and steeper. Moreover, tlie 
increase in the steepness of the curve is generally more for the lower income 
groups. Thus the increase in the tax burden of the lower income groups 
through periods has been higher than the higher income groups, in general. 
Table 4.4 shows the percentage increase in the VAT burden between periods 
for each income group. Period 2 is the only exception for this general rule. 
Between Period 1 and 2, the average tax burden increases for all income 
groups, but this increase is higher for the higher groups, especially if we 
compare three lowest with the three highest brackets. Thus the tax scheme is 
less regressive in Period 2. The reduction in the VAT rate on health has been 
more advantageous for the lower income groups, who spend more on health. 
For lower income groups, the weight of this positive effect has been higher 
than the weight of the negative effect due to the increase in the rate on standard 
and luxurious goods.
In Period 3, the tax burden has increased 52.5% for the lowest group, 
whereas the increase for the highe.st group is only 3.86%. The increase in the 
tax rate on basic foodstuff and heath has worsened the situation of the lower 
income groups much more than the higher income groups; however the high 
income groups were not effected much by the increase in the rate on luxurious 
goods.
In Period 4, the rates on basic foodstuff, health and luxurious goods increase 
further, and the standard rate falls by 1%. However the burden on the lower 
income groups again increases more than the higher income groups, especially 
if we compare the lowest 6 brackets with the others. Moreover the burden on 
the highest group and the third highest group (eighteenth group) decrease; this 
result is probably due to the decrease in the standard rate.
In Period 5 and 6 the burden continues to increase. In Period 6, the increase 
in the tax burden is quite uniform for all income groups. However, as we have 
stated before the resulting rate stnicture corresponds to a highly regressive 
system.
As a result the purpose of the change in the VAT stnicture from 1985 to 
1994 has been to increase the tax revenue from VAT at the expense of a more 
and more regressive tax structure. Thus the policy changes did not decrease the 
degree of regressivity, in spite of the very high rates applied on some goods 
that are assumed to be luxurious. Since we do not have the data about the VAT 
collected at each income level and the consumption patterns for all periods, we 
can not compare the behavioral responses to different rate structures. However, 
it can be claimed that a simpler structure with relatively lower rates and a 
progressive reimbursement mechanism can decrease the degree of regressivity 
even without decreasing tax revenue. We will discuss more about this 
conclusion in the next part, but before we proceed we need to have a look at 
the reimbursement mechanism as well.
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The reimbursement mechanism was introduced basically for the purpose of 
promoting the consumers to collect sales receipts from the retailers, rather than 
distributional considerations. At the beginning, only wage earners and 
pensioners were eligible to repayment credits, later the system was extended to 
all the income tax payers.
The reimbursement is on total monthly expenditure and is a graduated credit 
system that changes over an income range, but it does not vanish for higher 
income levels. The credit is 10% of the first 60.000 TL, 20% of the second 
60.000 TL, 12% of the next 80.000 TL and 5% of the spending above 200.000 
TL.
This mechanism does not contribute to lessen the regressivity since the 
reimbursement percentage is too low and since it does not distinguish between 
individuals having expenditure above 200.000 TL at all. Now with the 
adoption of an economic stabilization program after April 1994 the monthly 
reimbursement will be converted to a yearly reimbursement with a percentage 
of25.
4.5 Conclusion and Suggestions
In the light of the findings that VAT is regressive, our income tax system has 
become less progressive after 1980 and income distribution has become less 
equal in the same period, the efficiency advantages of VAT can not be 
regarded apart from the fairness aspects of the public finance structure as a 
whole.
In Turkey, where there is great inequality in the distribution of income and 
resources, it seems more fair to have a tax structure relying more heavily on 
direct taxes rather than indirect taxes.
VAT is a very important source of tax revenue and it is an efficient 
instrument to build self control in the economy. But with the increasing level 
of tax rates, under oligopolistic markets and high demand elasticities, VAT 
leads to rise in consumer prices. This in return leads to a tendency towards 
informal economy. Consumers will prefer to bargain for lower prices in return 
for not asking for invoices. The cancellation of monthly reimbursement will 
further increase this tendency.
Since the incidence of VAT is totally on consumers, the rise in VAT rates 
leads to a reduction in the consumption level of the wage earners whose 
income does not rise at all.
The indirect tax rates need not be too high to be able to increase the 
absolute level and proportion of indirect taxes within the total tax revenue. It is 
still possible to raise a high level of tax revenue with a relatively lower, 
uniform tax rate and a broad tax base and very few exemptions. On the other 
hand, the taxes on consumption and sales other than VAT must be gradually 
transferred to the coverage of VAT. But such a VAT scheme brings out the
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necessity for a real progressive reimbursement mechanism with a graduated 
credit system and a progressive public expenditure program. This system will 
reduce the level of evasion and take the informal sector back into the borders 
of the formal economy, which is an important key to increased tax revenues.
The progressivity measures with respect to income, corporate and wealth 
taxation are the basis of confronting the regressivity of VAT. The suggestions 
on general tax structure will be brought together in the final conclusion part.
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4.6 Appendix
Table 4.1 Development of the VAT Rate Structure in Turkey (1985-1993) 
Table 4.2 Consumption Pattern for Monthly Disposable Income Groups 
Table 4.3 VAT As a Percentage of Monthly Disposable Income 
Fig 4.1 VAT As a Percentage of Monthly Disposable Income
Table 4.4 Percentage Increase in the VAT Burden between Periods
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Table 4.1: Development of VAT Structure in Turkey
Periods
Basic
Foodstuff Health Standard Luxurious
1: Jan 1985-Dec 1986 0 10 10 10
2:Dec 198S-Jan 1988 0 5 12 12
3:Jan 1988-Oct 1990 3 8 12 15
4:O ct 1990-Dec 1990 5 11 11 20
5:Dec 1990-N ov l993 6 12 12 20
6:Nov 1993 - p resent 8 5 15 23
Source: Various Issues of Turkish O ffic ia l New spaper
Table 4.2: Consumption Pattern for Monthly Disposable Income Groups ( T U
Incom e
G roup Incom e Bracket Food Health Housing Standard Luxurious Total
1 0 -49999 122.60% 10.20% 47.21% 183.76% 293.41% 246.20%
2 50000 -99999 56,92% 4.51% 26.52% 90.45% 154.88% 128.36%
3 100000 -149999 44.24% 2.45% 21.36% 74.81% 128.67% 107.31%
4 150000 -199999 38.59% 2,56% 20.15% 67.45% 119,07% 98.92%
5 200000 -249999 33.12% 2.19% 17.73% 63.94% 108.67% 90.94%
6 250000 -299999 30.38% 1.79% 16.64% 56.83% 100.22% 83.58%
7 300000 -349999 26.42% 2,04% 16.46% 52.16% 94.82% 78.36%
8 350000 -399999 25.64% 2,10% 16.33% 51.57% 91.32% 75.00%
9 4 0 0000 -449 999 22.21% 1.71% 15.58% 47.22% 85.82% 70.23%
10 450000 -499999 21.31% 1,49% 15.64% 48.69% 87.54% 71.89%
11 500000 -599999 19.33% 1.83% 14.94% 46.15% 82.20% 67.26%
12 600000 -699999 19.14% 2.27% 15.72% 45.30% 84.50% 68.79%
13 700000 -799999 16.58% 1.85% 16.85% 42,65% 81.76% 64.91%
14 800000 -899999 14.47% 1.09% 16.14% 44.48% 86.45% 70.32%
15 900000 -999999 14.42% 1.84% ^ 16 .93% 41.77% 81.87% 64.94%
16 1000000 -1499999 11.61% 1.54% 13.11% 41.17% 72.22% 59.11%
17 1500000 -1999999 9.v59% 1.52% 9.48% 34.54% 59.73% 50.26%
18 2000000 -4999999 5.07% r  1.07% 6.28% 42.46% 58.47% 52.19%
19 5000000 -9999999 2.81% 0.89% 2.34% 10.97% 16.83% 14.49%
20 10000000 -24999999 1.25% 0.24% 1.12% 15.52% 18.58% 17.46%
Source: SIS (1987).
Table 4.3: VAT as a Percentage of Monthly Disposable Income
Incom e
G roup Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6
1 7.64 8.45 12.89 15.90 17.74 22.48
2 4.49 6.07 7.26 8.81 9.71 12.20
3 4.17 4.83 6.57 7.80 8.55 10.69
4 4.02 4.64 6.22 7.37 8.04 10.02
5 4.01 4.66 6.00 6.90 7.54 9.41
6 3.66 4.26 5.53 6.45 7.02 8.72
7 3.65 4.11 5.26 6.10 6.62 8.21
8 2.72 3.12 3.99 4.39 4.90 6.23
9 3.24 3.77 4.71 6.35 6.82 7.24
10 3.49 4.09 6.00 5.59 6.08 7.55
n 3.30 3.83 4.65 5.16 5.61 6.99
12 3.39 3.91 4.79 5.39 5.84 7.24
13 3.16 3.65 4.36 4.78 5.21 6.48
14 3.97 4.69 5.45 5.96 6.41 7.89
16 3.36 3.90 4.58 4.98 5.40 6.69
16 3.44 4.02 4.66 4.80 6.21 6.47
17 3.04 3.54 4.04 4.32 4.66 5.77
18 4.08 4.83 5.12 5.06 5.48 6.81
19 0.93 1.06 1.20 1.27 1.38 1.72
20 1.51 1.79 1.86 1.80 1.95 2.43
Figure 4.1: VAT as a Percentage of Monthly Disposable Income Group
period 1 
period 2 
period 3 
period 4 
period 5 
period 6
Table 4.4; % Increase in the VAT Burden Between Periods
Income Group Period 1-2 Period 2-3 Period 3-4 Period 4-5 Period 5-6
1 10.65 52.54 23.35 11.55 26.74
2 12.96 43.05 21.39 10.27 25.59
3 15.89 35.89 18.79 9.59 24.98
4 15.54 33.91 18.52 9.16 24.59
5 16.17 28.72 16.11 9.26 24.74
6 16.57 29.77 16.64 8,81 24.28
7 15.98 27.85 15.96 8.55 24.05
8 14.59 27.93 10.05 11.76 27.10
9 16.31 24.94 13.46 8.83 24.35
10 17.02 22.26 11,79 8,71 24.27
11 16.11 21.42 10.77 8.96 24.52
12 15.32 22.37 12.54 8.41 23.98
13 15.89 19.60 9.52 8.93 24.51
14 18.08 16.16 9.51 7.46 23.10
15 16.17 17.31 8.76 8.39 24.02
16 16.87 13.41 5.25 8.58 24.26
17 16.51 14.03 6.83 8.00 23.68
18 18.17 5.96 -1.12 8.39 24.20
19 13.29 13.85 5.75 8.62 24,32
20 18.89 3.86 -3.61 8.64 24.48
5 Conclusion
The public sector covers approximately fifty percent of the total economy in 
most countries. Therefore the public sector effects the distribution of income at 
least as an economic agent even if the states don't have such a policy. The 
government effects the distribution of income through the collection of taxes 
and public expenditures. Taxes that are the most important elements of 
government intervention are quite meaningful in this framework.
In this study, we first analyzed the elements that effect the distribution of 
income in Turkish tax system in general. Then the change in the degree of 
progressivity of income taxation, the redistributive effects of taxes on income 
and the change in the degree of regressivity of value-added taxation is 
analyzed.
The tax policies applied after 1980 have been effective in terms of 
redistributing income, but this effect has made the distribution of income even 
less equal. The after tax distribution of income has become more unequal for 
the wage earners, who represent the relatively lower income groups.
The degree of the progressivity of income taxation has in general decreased 
through nineteen eighties. The wage earners have creeped up the income scale 
due to increases in nominal income; the tax brackets were not properly 
adjusted to inflation rate, especially 1986 and 1993. The effective tax rates 
were much closer to the legal rates for the lower income groups than it was for 
the higher income groups. This further worsens the distribution of income to 
the disadvantage of the low income groups. Also the first bracket was too 
broad and this distorted the vertical tax equity.
The highest effective tax burden for the taxes on income is carried by the 
wage earners who represent a lower income group. The lowest burden is on the 
agricultural sector. Also the increase in the after tax share of the agricultural 
sector is quite higher than all other income groups. Although the agricultural 
sector doesn't correspond to an organized interest group, they represent an 
important political group in terms of their high population that corresponds to 
an important potential of voters. As a result, when the populist policies of the 
governments combine with the hardness of taxing this sector the tax rates are 
quite low.
Indeed the tax burden on all the factor income groups is lower than the 
wage income earning group. Even though the income taxation system is 
progressive to some extent, the tax burden on the group that earns profit in 
general, (including corporate sector and the people who work on their own) is 
lower than the wage earners. The tax burden on the rent and interest income 
earning groups is considerably low. If we consider the increasing shares they 
take from GDP, it is seen that their effective tax burden is quite low. This is an 
other sign about the illusion of progressivity in Tiu"kish tax structure.
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The reason for the low effective tax burden on this group is the economic 
policy that has been applied after 1980. The aim has been to apply an export 
oriented, liberal economic policy that aims at integration with the global 
economy, to give incentives to exports and to develop the stock exchange 
market. Creating a broad base of exemptions and leaving the interest earnings 
untaxed have been some of the measures to achieve such a policy. But this has 
created discrimination to the advantage of high income groups and also 
increased the tendency for tax evasion. The interest earnings on the state bonds 
are not taxed to increase the ability of the state to borrow from public and to 
develop the stock exchange market. The tax on the income from equities is 
quite low and the distributed profits are not taxed. These applications have 
resulted in important levels of loss in tax revenue. The banks in the stock 
exchange market have played an active role with the help of their intermediary 
corporations and investment funds in the stock market, to pull down the tax 
rate for these corporations from 46% to 10%5®. But these policies have had 
many socially and economically negative effects in addition to increased 
inequality in after tax distribution of income. Since the tax revenues are not 
enough to finance public expenditures, the cost is now being carried by the 
whole population. It is also obvious that the tax incentives that have been 
applied to the benefit of high income groups have not motivated capital to 
flow towards productive investment. Rather high income groups have prefened 
to earn high levels of profit from speculation. This where the Turkish economy 
has gone bankrupt right now.
In the analysis about the redistributive effects of taxation on different 
income groups, we considered only taxes on income because of limited data. 
The results would be much more striking if we could have obtained the 
effective distribution of taxes on wealth and consumption due to different 
factor income groups. The need for data that shows the shares of consumption 
items and the distribution of taxes on wealth for different factor income groups 
is quite urgent.
However, in part 4 we have seen that the value-added tax burden for the low 
income groups is much higher than the burden on high income groups. The 
increased rates of the indirect taxes increase the inequality in distribution of 
income to the disadvantage of the low income groups who spend more of their 
income on consumption. Moreover the situation has gotten worse for the lower 
income groups with a much more increasing rate than the higher income 
groups, after each change in the rates.
The exemption level for income taxation, which could have helped to 
recover the disadvantages of the tax system for the low income groups, has 
become irrelevant due to the effects of inflation.
As a result the tax system must be reconsidered as a whole to maintain tax 
equity. At this point our target will in most instances conflict with either
59§ener, 0.(1990), p.78.
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efficiency aspects or the needs of the government budget. Here the choices will 
depend on the choice of the social welfare function.
It is not proper to cover the budget deficit by decreasing the public 
expenditures, especially the ones that have positive effects in terms of 
developing the position of the poor. In order to increase the level of such 
expenditures, the sources of tax revenue must be utilized more effectively.
It is more proper to increase the weight of the direct taxes in a country like 
Turkey, where the distribution of income is already quite unequal.
The indirect tax rates need not be too high to be able to increase the absolute 
level and proportion of indirect taxes within the total tax revenue. It is still 
possible to raise a high level of tax revenue with a relatively lower, uniform 
tax rate and a broad tax base with very few exemptions. On the other hand, the 
taxes on consumption and sales other than VAT must be gradually transferred 
to the coverage of VAT. But such a VAT scheme brings out the necessity for a 
real progressive reimbursement mechanism with a graduated credit system and 
a progressive public expenditure program. This system will reduce the level of 
evasion and take the informal sector back into the borders of the formal 
economy.
The exemption level in income taxation must be set at least equal to the 
minimum wage level and the application of exemption must be limited with 
lower income groups. The tax rate at the lowest income bracket must be 
decreased gradually with respect to the budgetary limitations. The income 
brackets must be increased in order to achieve progressivity and the highest 
marginal tax rate must be set equal to 55% for efficiency purposes. The level 
of exemption and the income tax brackets must be adjusted due to inflation 
rate.
The income taxation system must be reorganized in order to achieve a 
unitary tax system. The exemptions and immunities must be limited to very 
few and important items. The distributed profits must be included within the 
income taxation scheme and while keeping the corporate tax rate at its present 
low level.
The income created through speculative earnings must be included 
effectively within the tax system.
Taxation is not simply a matter of passing laws, as we have already learned 
from our experience in Turkey. Therefore, more effective collection and 
control mechanisms must be established.
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